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Bisecting American Islam? Divide, Conquer, 
and Counter-Radicalization 
KHALED A. BEYDOUN* 
The United States Department of State has long employed a sectarian foreign policy 
strategy to advance its interests in the Mideast. The United States has sided staunchly 
with Saudi Arabia, the Sunni Muslim superpower in the region, while spurning Iran, the 
Shia Muslim hegemon that emerged in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution. 
 
This sectarian strategy reaped great benefit in the form of exclusive rights over Saudi oil 
and staving off Soviet influence in the Mideast. But the State Department’s unwavering 
allegiance to Saudi Arabia today exposes it to foreign attacks and “homegrown 
radicalization” inspired by terror networks driven by Wahhabism, the extremist Sunni 
ideology enshrined by its longtime ally. Through its historic at-all-costs support of Saudi 
Arabia, the U.S. has facilitated the spread of an ideology that spawned Al Qaeda, which 
coordinated the 9/11 terror attacks; and most recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (“ISIS”)the terror network that inspires extremism. 
 
Because of its link to Al Qaeda and ISIS, the United States Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) theorizes ISIS radicalization to be a distinctly “Sunni phenomenon.” 
This isolates Shia Muslims, who are systematically targeted and executed by ISIS in the 
Mideast, as natural allies that could advance counter-radicalization strategy against a 
common enemy. Which begs the question: what if DHS used the same divide-and-
conquer approach here at home? 
 
This Article investigates the budding sectarian strategy employed by DHS to advance its 
counter-radicalization program, and theorizes how prevailing sectarian tension within 
Muslim communities facilitates this strategy. In addition to integrating the historic and 
theological divisions between Sunni and Shia Muslims into legal literature, this Article: 
first, examines how increased polarization between Shia and Sunni Muslims facilitates 
DHS’s ability to recruit the former to monitor the latter; and second, how a sectarian 
counter-radicalization strategy makes the State an active participant in exacerbating 
sectarian tension among Muslim Americans, which raises First Amendment 
Establishment Clause concerns. 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law; Senior Affiliated Faculty, 
University of California, Berkeley, Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project (“IRDP”). I would like 
to thank Amara Majeed for her excellent research in support of this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The enemy of mine enemy is my friend.” 
Ancient Sanskrit proverb1 
Ford Road was a sea of green and black.2 The boulevard named 
after the iconic automaker, on this brisk Tuesday in October 2016, was 
the site of thousands exalting a visionary and pioneer of a different 
kind. “We’re with you, oh Hussein!” the believers chanted, in unison.3 
Their chorus met with the thudding drum of fists pounding on 
their chests. Women and men, children and the elderlymarching in 
remembrance of “Shia Islam’s” martyred saint,4 Hussein, son of Ali  
Ibn-Talib and grandson of the Prophet Muhammad.5 The procession 
unfolded 1336 years after the incident that inspired it, when Hussein 
was slain in the deserts of Karbala, Iraq, and the Shia-Sunni Muslim 
split was permanently bled into the sands of time (680 A.D.).6 
What appeared to be a foreign festival taking place in the American 
heartland, in fact, was a tradition observed in Dearborn, Michigan, for 
decades.7 It was Ashura, “the tenth day of the holy month of 
Muharram . . . .”8 An occasion for the black-clad Shia believers to march 
through the busiest artery of the blue-collar city to mourn Hussein, 
 
 1. KAUTILYA, THE ARTHASHASTRA 520 (L. N. Rangarajan ed. & trans., Penguin Books India 1992). 
 2. The colors of the religion of Islam and mourning the dead, respectively.  
 3. Niraj Warikoo, Shia Muslims March in Dearborn for Their Faith and Justice, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Oct. 9, 2016, 5:31 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/ 
10/09/shia-muslims-march-dearborn-their-faith-and-justice/91825602/.  
 4. “There are three major branches of Shi’ism: the Zaydis, the Isma’ilis, and the 
Twelvers. . . . The vast majority of Shi’is are Twelvers . . . .” This Article focuses on Twelver Shia 
Islam, and uses Shia Muslim to refer to Twelver Shiism. Laith Saud, Islamic Political Theology, in 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 95 (Aminah Beverly McCloud et al. eds., 2013).  
 5. LESLEY HAZLETON, AFTER THE PROPHET: THE EPIC STORY OF THE SHIA-SUNNI SPLIT IN ISLAM 
152 (2009).  
 6. “The Battle of Karbala, in the 7th Century, in which Hussein was killed, is often cited as the 
moment Shia and Sunni Muslims were cleaved apart.” Aleem Maqbool, Karbala: History’s Long 
Shadow, BBC NEWS KARBALA (May 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east 
-22657029.  
 7. VALI NASR, THE SHIA REVIVAL: HOW CONFLICTS WITHIN ISLAM WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE 31 
(2006).  
 8. Id. at 31. Ashoura is also the Arabic word for tenth.  
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their “sacrificial icon.”9 The assassination of Hussein permanently 
splintered Islam’s following only forty-eight years after the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad.10 That split, combined with Ashura’s indelible, 
enduring symbolism, is what separates, “the Shia apart from the Sunni 
most emphatically”11 in the Arab World, and in the American cities and 
communities Muslim Americans call home. 
This was not Teheran, Baghdad or Beirut, the traditional 
strongholds of Shi’ism, or what some have called “the other Islam,”12 
where the ornaments, spiritual leaders and central figures of Shia 
Islamic lore are near and native.13 It was Dearborn, Michiganthe seat 
of Ford Motor Company and the brainchild of its founder, Henry 
Ford14a quintessentially American city by every measure. 
Beginning in the 1960s, Dearborn also became the gathering point 
for Shia Muslim immigrants. The first immigrants came from 
Lebanon,15 and in the early 1990s, Iraqi Shia Muslims arrived in 
Dearborn.16 Celebrated broadly as “America’s Muslim capital,”17 closer 
scrutiny reveals that Dearborn is, more accurately, the “heart of Shiism” 
in the United States.18 Firmly steeped in the American Midwest, a 
hemisphere away from the bloody proxy wars between Shia Iran and 
Sunni Saudi Arabia,19 which are polarizing the “Mideast”20 more than 
 
 9. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 158. 
 10. The Prophet Muhammad died on June 8, 632 A.D. in Medina. Id. at 49. 
 11. NASR, supra note 7, at 44.  
 12. NASR, supra note 7, at 31–61 (Nasr calls Shia Islam the “other Islam” because of its modern 
status as a demographic minority, and as articulated in the book’s first chapter, the sect denied 
succession of leadership following the death of the Prophet Muhammad on June 8, 632 A.D.).  
 13. “The [ornate carved] hand represents the five holy people whom the Shia hold in highest 
regard: the Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatima al-Zahra, his son-in-law and cousin Ali, and 
his grandsons Hasan and Husayn. The hand and the black flag mark Shia houses, mosques, and 
processions from India to the Middle East.” NASR, supra note 7, at 33.  
 14. See generally HEATHER B. BARROW, HENRY FORD’S PLAN FOR THE AMERICAN SUBURB: 
DEARBORN AND DETROIT (2015) (examining how the rise of the Ford Motor Company also drove the 
suburbanization of metropolitan Detroit, and specifically, the development of Dearborna suburb 
so intertwined with the automobile manufacturer).  
  15. KAMBIZ GHANEABASSIRI, A HISTORY OF ISLAM IN AMERICA: FROM THE NEW WORLD TO THE NEW 
WORLD ORDER 298 (2010).  
 16. Andrew Shryock et al., The Terror Decade in Arab Detroit: An Introduction, in ARAB 
DETROIT 9/11: LIFE IN THE TERROR DECADE 15 (Nabeel Abraham et al. eds., 2011).  
 17. Porochista Khakpour, Reality TV Goes Where Football Meets the Hijab, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 
10, 2011), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/arts/television/all-american-muslim-on-tlc-life 
-in-dearborn-michigan.html. 
 18. Rachel Zoll, American Shias Struggle with Their Future, ASBURY PARK PRESS, July 19, 2009, 
at E3.  
 19. For a concise survey and description of these modern proxy wars in the Mideast, see Khaled 
A. Beydoun & Hamada D. Zahawi, Divesting from Sectarianism: Reimagining Relations Between 
Iran and the Arab Gulf States, 69 COLUM. J. INT’L AFFAIRS 47, 48–50 (2016). 
 20. In this Article, I use “Mideast” to refer to the geographic region encompassing the 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates. Mideast is interchangeable with 
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ever before, Dearborn is the frontline of America’s Shia Muslim 
population. 
At a clip of three Shia Muslims for every one Sunni Muslim,21 
Dearborn’s Shia population is a prominent part of the City’s identity.22 
It boasts five Shia mosques, including the opulent Islamic Center of 
America on Ford Road,23 nonprofits and charities championing Shia 
oriented causes, and during every Muharram, American citizens 
extoling Hussein and tying his martyrdom story to their current 
circumstance: these Shia are a “minority within the Muslim [American] 
community,”24 simultaneously vulnerable to rising “Islamophobia”25 
and the indignation of Sunnis, the majority segment of the Muslim 
population in the United States and globally.26 
During Dearborn’s Ashura procession of 2016, resounding and 
recurring condemnations of Saudi Arabia and ISIS,27 and Wahhabism,28 
 
“Middle East,” which is a “function of social construction . . . the Middle East was invented from 
political considerations, not any natural geography.” JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED: AMERICA’S 
INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITY 65 (2009).  
 21. Sally Howell & Andrew Shryock, Cracking Down on Diaspora: Arab Detroit and America’s War 
on Terror, in ARAB DETROIT 9/11: LIFE IN THE TERROR DECADE 70 (Nabeel Abraham et al. eds., 2011).  
 22. “Shiism in Dearborn is remarkable for the extent to which it is local (organized along village 
and clan lines particular to south Lebanon) and universal (with links to a world community of Shia 
whose political and spiritual centers are in Iran and Iraq).” ARAB DETROIT: FROM MARGIN TO 
MAINSTREAM 200 (Nabeel Abraham & Andrew Shryock eds., 2000).  
 23. The original Islamic Center of America was constructed in 1964 in Detroit, by Mohamad 
Jawad Chirri. The new Center sits on Ford Road in the heart of Dearborn, and is “one of the largest 
and more opulent mosques in the United States.” GHANEABASSIRI, supra note 15, at 298.  
 24. QAMAR-UL HUDA, DIVERSITY OF MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES: VIEWS AS AMERICANS 6 
(2006). 
 25. I define “Islamophobia” as:  
[T]he presumption that Islam is inherently violent, alien, and inassimilable. . . . [and] the 
belief that expressions of Muslim identity are correlative with a propensity for terrorism. 
It argues that Islamophobia is rooted in understandings of Islam as civilization’s 
antithesis and perpetuated by government structures and private 
citizens. . . . Islamophobia is also a process—namely, the dialectic by which state policies 
targeting Muslims endorse prevailing stereotypes and, in turn, embolden private animus 
toward Muslim subjects.  
Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
ONLINE 108, 111 (2016). See generally ERIK LOVE, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND RACISM IN AMERICA (2017) 
(defining Islamophobia focusing on the racialization of Muslim identity).  
 26. “[A]t least 40% of Sunnis do not accept Shias as fellow Muslims. In many cases, even greater 
percentages do not believe that some practices common among Shias, such as visiting the shrines of 
saints, are acceptable as part of Islamic tradition.” The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2012).  
 27. “Various signs at the rally read: ‘Muslims Stand Against ISIS,’ ‘Muslims Against Terror,’ and 
‘Live Free or Die with Dignity!!.’ . . . And some signs called for the release of Shia leaders held captive 
in countries and criticized Israel and Saudi Arabia for what they consider oppression.” Warikoo, 
supra note 3.  
 28. “Saudi Arabia’s export of the rigid, bigoted, patriarchal, fundamentalist strain of Islam 
known as Wahhabism has fueled global extremism and contributed to terrorism. As the Islamic State 
projects its menacing calls for violence into the West, directing or inspiring terrorist attacks in 
country after country . . . .” Scott Shane, Saudis and Extremism: ‘Both the Arsonists and the 
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were prominent. From the vantage point of the U.S. government and 
Shia Muslims, Saudi Arabia and ISIS are the very entities that inspire 
and mobilize the “homegrown radicalization” of Sunni Muslims in the 
U.S.29 Radicalization among Muslims is generally believed to be a 
distinctly Sunni phenomenon, a view that steers the DHS “counter-
radicalization” program,30 established as the state’s primary 
counterterror program under President Barack Obama.31 
The spiritual procession unfolding on the streets of Dearborn, and 
the Shia Muslim population within the city, still fit within the discursive 
stereotypes of the “Muslim or Middle Eastern terrorist.”32 However, in 
light of the distinctly Sunni extremist elements that drive radicalization 
and the DHS’s preoccupation with fighting it within Muslim American 
communities, Shia Muslim strongholds, institutions, and individuals 
within the U.S. avail DHS with untapped partnership opportunities 
against the threat of homegrown radicalization. For DHS, Shia Muslims 
are an attractive alternative to the Muslim sect, Sunnism, that it alleges 
is disproportionately susceptible to radicalization. And thus, DHS 
considered Shia Muslims a coveted partner to carry forward  
counter-radicalization strategy and programming. 
Furthermore, considering that extremist Sunni factions like ISIS 
target the U.S. and Shia Muslims as sworn enemies, the interests of 
DHS and Shia Muslim Americans converge with regard to countering 
ISIS’s appeal stateside, and moreover, preventing their potential to 
 
Firefighters’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/ 
middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam.html?_r=0. For an accessible work on Wahhabi and Salafi thought 
and their contemporary political impact, see DAVID COMMINS, THE WAHHABI MISSION AND SAUDI 
ARABIA (2006).  
 29. Radicalization is the process by which an individual adopts an extremist ideology that is 
linked to terrorist activity. Although not explicitly associated with Islam, the term has been 
discursively and politically linked to Muslims. See Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization”, 3 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 809, 811 (2013). See generally Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter) 
Terrorism, 88 TEX L. REV. 1715 (2010) (examining the origins of U.S. law and policy addressing 
homegrown radicalization).  
 30.  “[C]ounter-radicalization conforms to the preemptive logic of counterterrorism, which 
focuses on strategies that minimize the risk and intensity of future terrorist attacks.” Samuel J. 
Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 125, 127 (2012).  
 31. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering 
Violent Extremism (Feb. 18, 2015); see also WHITE HOUSE, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO 
PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) [hereinafter 2011 DHS COUNTER-
RADICALIZATION PROGRAM] (the first document issued by President Obama outlining the strategic 
framework for counter-radicalization policing). 
 32. See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1586 (2002). Both 
historically and more intensely in light of the protracting “war on terror” and rising Islamophobia, 
“the American public is being instructed that looking ‘Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim’ equals 
‘potential terrorist.’” Id. at 1582. See generally ROBERT J. ALLISON, THE CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 1776–1815 (1995) (describing a history of formative 
perceptions of Islam and Muslims held by American founding fathers, which seeded the popular 
tropes that prevail today). 
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“radicalize” Muslims within the U.S. From DHS’s vantage point, if 
Sunni extremists are the enemy, then Shia Muslims may be a critical 
ally against the threat they pose. This was very much the case under the 
Obama Administration, and while President Trump and his 
administration’s broad demonization of Islam has again blurred these 
lines, the continued framing of Muslim radicalization as a Sunni 
phenomenon leaves the door open for strategic recruitment of Shia 
Muslims to carry forward countering violent extremism (“CVE”) 
programming under his presidency, and even more so, beyond it. 
Moreover, warming relations between the Department of State 
(“DOS”) and Iran brokered by the Obama Administration, signaled by 
the lifting of sanctions on the Shia Muslim theocracy in January 2016,33 
opens the door for a domestic rapprochement: namely, with Shia 
Muslim Americans as prospective partners in the fight against Sunni-
inspired radicalization. Indeed, shifting relationships in the Mideast 
facilitate the possibility of forging new collaborations on home, 
particularly when the interests of DHS and Shia Muslim Americans 
converge in the face of a common rival. 
Exploitation of sectarian hostility in the Mideast has long played a 
central role in American foreign policy engagement in the region. If 
inflaming the Sunni-Shia’a divide to advance U.S. interests abroad is 
formal DOS policy, what prevents DHS from capitalizing on Muslim 
sectarian tension stateside to carry forward national security goals? 
Sectarian tension is not isolated to the Middle East, and events in the 
region have the direct effect of inflaming tensions and creating division 
and discord amongst Shia and Sunni Muslims within the U.S. This has a 
twofold effect on domestic counterterrorism policing: mounting 
counterterror programming to prevent “homegrown radicalization” 
inspired by extremist Sunni groups (most notably Al Qaeda and ISIS), 
and the strategic counterterror opportunities among segments of the 
Muslim American population victimized by such groupsmost notably, 
Shia Muslims. While a growing body of legal literature has investigated 
the former effect, this Article is the first to closely analyze the latter. 
Exploiting sectarian tensions has been a staple of American foreign 
policy engagement in the Mideast. With rising national security concern 
over homegrown radicalization, the Obama Administration’s expansion 
of counter-radicalization policing, and the Trump Administration’s 
extension of it, this Article investigates how DHS may seek to capitalize 
on sectarian tensions, and abet in the process of stoking it, to carry 
forward CVE policing. 
 
 33. Darren Boyle, U.S. Lifts Sanctions on Iran After 37 Years in Historic Thaw as UN Atomic 
Agency Rules It Has Met Conditions of Nuclear Deal, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 16, 2016, 5:49 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3403039/US-lifts-sanctions-Iran-eight-years-historic-
thaw-atomic-agency-rules-met-conditions-nuclear-deal.html.  
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Under the Obama Administration, DHS sought to capitalize on 
Muslim American sectarian (and sub-sectarian) tensions by framing 
radicalization as a distinctly Sunni phenomenon, which thereby 
precludes or diminishes the prospect of Shia Muslims being classified as 
subjects of state interest and prioritizing strategic partnerships with 
Shia religious leaders, institutions and communities, to function as 
partners of counter-radicalization policing. More specifically, DHS 
deputized Shia religious leaders as informants.34 While the Trump 
Administration’s vilification of Islam seems to shift CVE away from a 
sectarian strategy, the fluidity of his administrationand what may 
come after itillustrates that it will hardly be deserted. This Article, 
written shortly after the transition from the Obama Administration to 
the Trump Administration, also lays the scholarly groundwork for 
understanding how sectarian hostility may be exploited to carry forward 
counterterror strategy, and anticipate how future administrations may 
seek to exploit it to police Muslim subjects. 
The political and constitutional ramifications of a sectarian 
counter-radicalization strategy are ominous and extensive. Such a 
strategy will exacerbate already rife tension between Sunni and Shia 
Muslim Americans. In addition to the polarizing effect the divisive 
politics of the Mideast have had on cross-sectarian relationships, a 
counterterror regime that capitalizes on theological fault lines will 
compound this hostility by giving it an exclusively American dimension. 
From a legal standpoint, a sectarian counter-radicalization strategy 
poses serious First Amendment concerns. My past research,35 and the 
work of other law scholars,36 has analyzed how counter-radicalization 
policing infringes on core First Amendment Free Exercise and Speech 
protection.37 Since the bulk of this work has examined infringements on 
Free Exercise, this Article will shift its focus to how a sectarian CVE 
policing strategy raises Establishment Clause concerns. 
By framing homegrown radicalization as a distinctly Sunni Muslim 
phenomenon and exploiting sectarian hostilities stateside to develop 
strategic partnership among Shia Muslims in the U.S. to counter that 
threat, this Article argues that CVE strategy and policing may be 
endorsing religion and inflaming religious tension in contravention of 
 
 34. DHS outreach into Shia communities is already in progress.  
 35. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia, and Erasure: Poor and Muslim 
in “War on Terror” America, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1463 (2016) (focusing on how counter-radicalization 
policing disproportionately focuses on indigent and working-class Muslim American communities, 
and consequently, disparately infringes on their First Amendment rights).  
 36. The work of Aziz Huqq, Amna Akbar, Sahar Aziz, and Samuel P. Rascoff, whose scholarship 
is cited within this Article, examines the tension between counter-radicalization policing and civil 
liberties, and mainly, the First Amendment.  
 37. “[C]ore First Amendment activity, unconnected to any suspicion of criminal 
activitybecomes a predictor for criminality.” Akbar, supra note 29, at 835.  
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the First Amendment Establishment Clausewhich is doctrinally in 
flux under this Supreme Court and inferior courts. Amid this flux, this 
Article will seek to provide general analysis of under the current state of 
the Establishment Clause, examining it under preferred tests and 
doctrine. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I synthesizes the historic 
and theological division between Shia and Sunni Islam and closes with a 
discussion of sectarian demographics of both groups in the U.S. 
Part II examines how the U.S. Department of State, from its 
bilateral alliance with the Saudi Arabia in 1933 to the Obama 
Administration’s rapprochement with Iran in 2016, has carefully 
deployed a sectarian strategy to further its interest in the Mideast. 
Part III turns its attention to modern counterterror strategy and 
the framing of homegrown radicalization as a distinctly Sunni Muslim 
phenomenon that enables collaborative opportunities with Shia Muslim 
partners. In turn, DHS sought to cultivate a sectarian national security 
strategy to prevent terrorism in the U.S., navigated through the CVE 
framework. 
Finally, Part IV provides a general analysis of the constitutionality 
of a sectarian CVE policing strategy according to prevailing 
Establishment Clause doctrine. 
I.  A HOUSE DIVIDED 
“Oh God, have pity on those who succeed me.” 
The Prophet Muhammad38 
 “The divide between Shiism and Sunnism is the most important in 
Islam.”39 It is, at once, the break that bisects Islam along theological 
lines and the formative fault line that harkens the “passion story” of 
Shia Muslim martyrdom and marginalization at the hands of Sunni 
Muslims.40 It is a narrative spawned first by the succession debate that 
emerged after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D.,41 which 
concluded with his companion Abu Bakr as the leader instead of Ali, his 
son-in-law. And nearly four decades later, the dramatic incident in the 
deserts of Karbala that would intensely deepen the divide within 
Islamthe assassination of Hussein. 
 
 38. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 16.  
 39. NASR, supra note 7, at 34.  
 40. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 16. Believers analogize the slaying of Hussein to the gruesome 
execution of Jesus, a revered prophet in Islam, and relate the passion story of Hussein to the 
precedent “Passion of the Christ.” Hazelton extends this analogy, observing, “[t]hen came the eve of 
the final dayashura, the tenth of Muharramthe setting for the Shia equivalent of the Last 
Supper.” HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 187.  
 41. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 10.  
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Islam is routinely framed as a monolithic creed, both discursively 
and routinely within legal literature.42 Yet, the third of the three 
Abrahamic faiths is anything but. This myth ignores the volatile 
relationship between Shia and Sunni Muslims, which is climaxing today 
with proxy wars in Syria, Yemen, the broader Gulf,43 and unprecedented 
tensions across sectarian lines among Muslim Americans. Since the 
initial revelations of Islam to the Prophet Muhammad in 609 A.D.,44 the 
overwhelming course of Islam’s history has been marred by theological 
disunity and, during many impasses, sectarian strife. A House divided, 
the formative and contemporary battles within Islam, defy the deeply 
embedded trope that Islam is a homogenous creed, united following or 
a monolithic “civilization.”45 
This Part provides a historical, theological and demographic 
overview of the sectarian split within Islam. While not intended to be 
comprehensive, it provides a useful and general primer. Part A 
examines the genesis of the Shia and Sunni Muslim divide, which began 
to splinter shortly after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Part B 
provides an overview of core Sunni and Shia theological beliefs, 
focusing most closely on areas of doctrinal dispute and distinction. 
Finally, Part C provides a demographic survey of Muslim America along 
sectarian lines, with discussion of Sunni and Shia mosques and rising 
hostility between the two groups. 
 
 42. The George W. Bush Administration stewarded the “redeployment of old Orientalist tropes” 
following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, which caricatured Islam and Muslims as savage, 
violent, and bent on destroying the U.S. See Volpp, supra note 32, at 1586 (citing EDWARD SAID, 
ORIENTALISM (1978), describing the landmark work that coins and frames the theory of Orientalism, 
which positions the West, or “Occident,” as the superior counterpoint and antithesis of the inferior 
Middle East, or “Orient”). These tropes were intensified with the emergence of Islamophobia, and its 
deployment in the 2016 presidential campaign. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Viewpoint: Islamophobia 
Has a Long History in the US, BBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
magazine-34385051.  
 43. See generally Beydoun & Zahawi, supra note 19 (providing a summary of these proxy 
conflicts and wars as a preface to examining how foreign investment can mitigate tensions).  
 44. Islam was “revealed to the Arabian trader Muhammad between 609 and 632 . . . .” SYLVIANE 
A. DIOUF, SERVANTS OF ALLAH: AFRICAN MUSLIMS ENSLAVED IN THE AMERICAS 4 (1998). 
 45. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD 
ORDER (1996) (the most cited and popular work arguing that “Western civilization,” and namely the 
United States, is at odds and poised to clash with “Islamic civilization”). But see Khaled Ali Beydoun, 
Comment, Dar al-Islam Meets “Islam as Civilization”: An Alignment of  
Politico- Theoretical Fundamentalisms and the Geopolitical Realism of This Worldview, 4 UCLA J. 
ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 143, 159 (2005) (critiquing Huntington focusing specifically on discrediting his 
construction of an “Islamic civilization”). 
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A. THE GENESIS OF SECTARIAN DIVISION 
1.   The First Divide: Succession After Muhammad 
There would likely have been no Shia-Sunni divide if the Prophet 
Muhammad had a son.46 The rift centered around succession and who 
should assume the helm of Islam after the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad, Islam’s final Prophet and whose mission to bring together 
a people divided by tribal lines through the new faith began to give way 
instantly at his death at the age of sixty-three.47 
While Muhammad made overtures as to whom should succeed 
him, he never “formally appointed a successor” before he succumbed to 
a high-fever.48 The mantle of Islam’s leadership was a coveted post, and 
debate about who should claim it began even before the Prophet was 
finally laid to rest on June 8, 632 A.D.49 The Prophet Muhammad left 
this question unanswered and his post unfilled, so the pioneering 
community of Muslimscomprised of his closest companions, family 
members, and Saudi clansconvened to name a successor in the 
immediate wake of Islam’s holiest man’s death.50 
For the community of original Muslims tasked with the burden to 
find a solution,51 the matter of Muhammad’s succession hinged on a 
debate pitting divine lineage against the will of the ummahor 
community of Muslims.52 Would it be Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s 
“first cousin and the man whose name the Shia were to take as their 
own[?]”53 Shia Muslims today still staunchly claim that it was the 
Prophet Muhammad’s intent to pass his authority on to Ali. 
Or, would authority transfer to one of his companions? As 
steadfastly maintained by Sunnis, who argued that Islam was chiefly 
committed to equality across familial or tribal lines, thus mandating 
that divine lineage be sidestepped for community consensus.54 This 
 
 46. “If a son had existed, perhaps the whole history of Islam would have been different. The 
discord, the civil war, the rival caliphates, the split between Sunni and Shiaall might have been 
averted.” HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 10.  
 47. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 7.  
 48. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 15. 
 49. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 49. 
 50. WILFERD MADELUNG, THE SUCCESSION TO MUHAMMAD: A STUDY OF THE EARLY CALIPHATE  
68 (1997).  
 51. This was the first council, or shura (Arabic), that convened to discuss matters pivotal to 
Islam after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.  
 52. Arabic.  
 53. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 32. In addition to being the Prophet Muhammad’s first cousin, 
Ali was also the first person to accept Islam, and the husband of Muhammad’s daughter Fatima. 
HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 36–37. Shia Muslims derived their name from “Shiat-Ali,” which means 
“followers of Ali.” HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 32.  
 54. “To Sunnis, the shura would be the perfect example of the wisdom of consensus, of a 
community newly empowered to resolve its disputes and to find the right solution. The Prophet 
trusted them to find the right leader, they maintained.” HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 61.  
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position supported the argument that the Prophet’s most senior adviser 
and “best friend,”55 Abu Bakr, should be named next caliph.56 Sunni 
Muslims, today, contend that it was the Prophet’s aim to pass on the 
leadership of Islam to his companions, and by doing so, dismantle the 
institution of divine lineage housed entirely within one clan. 
The debate over who should succeed the Prophet Muhammad was 
turbulent and polarized along the line of lineage and divine right. Fiery 
“[s]peeches gave way to shouting” and violence ensued, until Abu 
Bakrnot Aliwas confirmed as Islam’s first caliph.57 
The cohort that would ultimately become Sunni Muslims backed 
the winner, Abu Bakr, and those who would become Shia Muslims 
supported Ali, the natural successor stripped of his “divine” claim to 
leadership, they claim.58 The first council of Muslims following the 
death of the Prophet Muhammad would become a lasting metaphor for 
Shia Muslims, and most climactically, foreshadowed a bloodier defeat 
at the hands of Sunnis roughly four decades later. 
Ali “would be passed over not once or even twice, but three times” 
after the Prophet Muhammad’s death twenty-five years earlier.59 
Following Abu Bakr, Omar, and Othman, Ali was named Islam’s fourth 
caliph.60 For Shia Muslims, this pattern of passing over and relegating 
Ali was more a sign of blatant Sunni disrespect of Ahl al-Bayt (family of 
the Prophet Muhammad) that it was a sign of community consensus.61 
Sunni Muslim “disinheritance” of Ali would embed disrespect and 
relegation into the Shia spiritual and political fabric,62 and marked the 
first sectarian divide within Islam. 
 
 55. Saud, supra note 4, at 85.  
 56. Caliph is the Arabic word for successor, and its holds the double-meaning of religious and 
political leader.  
 57. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 64–65.  
 58. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 70–71.  
 59. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 69.  
 60. “For Sunnis, the time of these caliphs was Islam’s golden age, an era when political authority 
continued to be informed by the pristine values of the faith and when Muslim society remained close 
to its spiritual roots.” NASR, supra note 7, at 35. These four caliphs are jointly remembered as the 
Rashidun (“righteously guided” in Arabic) by Sunni Muslims, revered because their collective rule 
was said to be without internal conflict or discord (a point Shias disagree with). See generally TAYEB 
EL-HIBRI, PARABLE AND POLITICS IN EARLY ISLAMIC HISTORY: THE RASHIDUN CALIPHS (2010) 
(describing a comprehensive and detailed history of each of the four caliph’s leadership).  
 61. Arabic.  
 62. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 70–71.  
They [Shias] had been disinherited, deprived of what they saw as their rightful place, the 
leadership of Islam. And this sense of disinheritance would sear deep into Shia hearts and 
minds, a wound that would fester through to the twentieth century, there to feed off 
opposition to Western colonialism and erupt first in the Iranian Revolution, then in civil 
war in Lebanon, and then, as the twenty-first century began, in the war in Iraq. 
Disinheritance was a rallying cry . . . .  
Id.  
BEYDOUN-69.2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2018  10:20 AM 
February 2018]                 BISECTING AMERICAN ISLAM? 441 
The second, and more pronounced and potent divide, would by the 
bloody assassination and martyrdom Ali’s son, Hussein, which would 
become the most definitive and potent event in Shia Muslim history. 
And an event that remains focal to the religious and political identities 
of Shia Muslims, all over the world, today. 
2.   The Second Divide: The Assassination of Hussein 
Ali reigned as caliph from 656–661 A.D. and became the first of 
Shia Muslims twelve revered Imams.63 Atop his favorite riding camel, 
Ali died on January 26, 661,64 leaving behind two sons, Hasan and 
Hussein.65 
Hussein became keen on “bringing the caliphate back where it 
belonged, to the Ahl al-Bayt, the House of Muhammad.”66 However, he 
faced an imposing obstacle. Muawiya was the “undisputed fifth Caliph” 
after Ali’s death67 and presided over a dynasty that stood in the way of 
Hussein’s aim of claiming the caliphate. From his political seat in 
Damascus, Muawiya “commanded a powerful army, but important 
Muslims were uncomfortable with the new political orderit reminded 
them of the days before Islam.”68 Under Muawiya, the caliphate was 
riddled with corruption, graft and nepotism, which contravened the 




Furthermore, Muawiya sought to groom his “spoiled” son, Yazid, to 
become his successor.69 Ironically, Muawiya endeavored to install a 
hereditary succession of the caliphate, the very institution the earliest 
Sunni Muslims sought to avoid, and which Hussein’s father, Ali, 
fervently argued in favor of at the first council following the Prophet 
 
 63. Imam is the Arabic word for spiritual leader. Imams were the divinely inspired figures who 
inherited the authoritative knowledge and lawmaking authority of the Prophet Muhammad following 
his death in 632 A.D. 
 64. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 151–52. 
 65. Ali’s camel carried his dead body into Najaf, in modern Iraq, where he was buried and today 
the site of “the first great Shi’ite shrine” in his name. Lieutenant Colonel Adam Oler, A Brief 
Introduction to the Sunni-Shi’ite Struggle: Six Key Points, 35 REP. 2, 4 (2008).  
 66. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 157. 
 67. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 163. 
 68. Saud, supra note 4, at 90.  
 69.  
[Yazid] was the image of a spoiled scion given to drink and dissipation, the antithesis of 
the Islamic ideal. ‘A silk-wearing drunkard,’ Hasan once called him. . . . Muawiya’s son 
seemed to be a kind of seventh-century version of a good old boy from Texas, succeeding 
his father to the highest office in the land. 
HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 167. Al-Saud characterized Yazid as, “a man totally devoid of character. 
He not only violated Qur’anic norms, he ridiculed them.” Saud, supra note 4, at 92.  
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Muhammad’s death. Yet, the absurdity of this reversal typified the 
turbulence that is said to characterize Ummayad Rule, which would 
devolve into unbridled despotism if Yazid became caliph, Hussein and 
his followers believed.70 
Muawiya died in 680 A.D., a year that still lives in infamy for Shia 
Muslims. The Ummayad ruler’s death opened the door for the despotic 
Yazid to become caliph, and led to the dramatic faceoff between him 
and Hussein.71 Determined to bring back “goodness, justice, and truth” 
to the Islamic community or die in pursuit of those principles,72 
Hussein: 
The third [Shia Muslim] Imam, son of the first and brother of the 
second, set out from Mecca for Iraq in September of 680, with his 
family and just seventy-two armed men, not knowing that he was 
journeying toward his deaththat within the month, he was destined 
to become forever the Prince of Martyrs.73 
That trek across the deserts of Iraq would be his last. On October 
10, 680 A.D., Yazid’s men massacred Hussein and his small militia in 
Karbala.74 Although Hussein and his seventy-two men fought valiantly 
against Yazid’s army of four-thousand, the odds were too great and the 
blows striking from every angle too piercing and fatal. At the end, 
Hussein, the grandson of Islam’s messenger and greatest prophet, was 
left with thirty-three knife and sword wounds and a decapitated head.75 
His bloody and brutal assassination made Yazid the undisputed caliph, 
but far more crucially, gave Shia Islam its spiritual martyr and timeless 
symbol. 
Hussein’s martyrdom at the hands of the Sunni Ummayad 
leadership remains the spiritual and political heartbeat of Shia Islam. It 
is the crucifixion moment for Shiite Muslims,76 an event that 
simultaneously spawns uncontrollable sadness and inspires devoted 
reverence. It is an event that is commemorated every year in Dearborn, 
Michigan, Tehran, Iran, and every other city and town with Shiite 
Muslims. Mourning the martyrdom of Hussein is a cornerstone of Shia 
Islamic practice, and even more so, the heartbeat of Shia political 
identity. 
 
 70. “Under the Umayyads the caliphs became both pope and Caesar . . . .” NASR, supra note 7, at 36.  
 71. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 157–58.  
 72. “Consequently al-Husayn rose to fight him [Yazid] in the knowledge that, should he die in 
the fight, the principle would nonetheless live: goodness, justice, and truth are eternal values to 
which one gives oneself over fully.” Saud, supra note 4, at 92.  
 73. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 173. 
 74. HAZLETON, supra note 5, 190–91. 
 75. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 191–92. 
 76. “The story of what happened so long ago on the banks of the Euphrates has become a 
symbol, like the crucifixion in Jerusalem for Christians, of the eternal conflict between good and 
evil.” PATRICK COCKBURN, MUQTADA: MUQTADA AL-SADR, THE SHIA REVIVAL, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
IRAQ 17 (2008).  
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For Islam at large, the massacre of Hussein is the second and 
bloodiest fault line that still divides the world’s 1.8 billion Muslims.77 
For Shia Muslims, as illustrated on the streets of Dearborn, on October 
10, 2016, it is a living and potent metaphor for the continued and 
contemporary injustices inflicted on Shia Muslims by “Sunni 
oppressors.”78 For this sect, all things political start and end with the 
martyrdom of Hussein. Still, the core doctrinal differences are rooted in 
the first divide, when Abu Bakr was confirmed as the Prophet 
Muhammad’s first successor at the expense of Ali. 
B. SHIA AND SUNNI MUSLIM THEOLOGY 
1.   Primary Distinctions and Overlap 
The turbulent events following the Prophet Muhammad’s death 
spawned the core theological differences between Shia and Sunni Islam. 
The debate over who should succeed the Prophet Muhammad 
highlights the crux of the spiritual discord between Islam’s principal 
sects: whether Islam’s leadership was a matter of divine lineage or 
community consensus.79 Shia Muslims are unequivocal about the 
importance of divine lineage and hold that Ali, his sons, and their male 
progeny should hold authority over the Muslim community. Conversely, 
community consensus regarding matters of succession, law, and 
authority form the foundation of Sunni Islam.80 Before analyzing the 
theological idiosyncrasies that emanate from the genesis story 
presented in Part I.A, examination of theological overlap is a critical 
first step. 
“[N]obody . . . should forget that what unites the two main 
branches of Islam is far greater that (sic) what divides them . . . .”81 
First, both Shia and Sunni Islam are rooted in the principal Islamic 
belief that “none has the right to be worshipped but Allah, and 
Muhammadpeace and blessings be upon himis the Messenger of 
 
 77. Michael Lipka, Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in the U.S. and Around the World, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2017), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key-
findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/. 
 78. Sayed Mohammad Jawad Al-Qazwini, a prominent Shia religious leader based out of Los 
Angeles, California, routinely orates about “the discrimination and violence that Shiite Muslims have 
suffered at the hands of Sunni Muslims.” Omar Sacirbey, Shiite Muslims Quietly Establish Foothold 
in U.S., WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/ 
shiite-muslims-quietly-establish-a-foothold-in-us/2012/10/02/f21dc568-0cd6-11e2-ba6c-07bd866e 
b71a_story.html?utm_term=.8cead8205053. This theme is tied to the massacre of Hussein in 
Karbala, and a focal message delivered over and again by Shia Imams within and beyond the U.S. 
 79. “[S]acredness inheres in the Prophet’s blood family, as the Shia believe, or in the community 
as a whole, as Sunnis believe . . . .” HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 211.  
 80. Saud, supra note 4, at 85.  
 81. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 211. 
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Allah.”82 Both sects also consider the Qur’an, Islam’s Holy Book 
delivered to the Prophet Muhammad by the angel Gabriel, as the 
primary and supreme source of divine law.83 These two elements 
comprise the very core of Islamic belief. But the distinctions outlined 
below illustrate where Shia and Sunni Muslims depart. Thus, the two 
share far more in common in terms of religious belief than they do 
differences. 
The “five pillars of Islam” form the framework of core values and 
obligations for Sunni Muslims. These pillars are: “confession of the 
faith, prayer, zakat (religious tax), fasting [during the holy month of 
Ramadan], and pilgrimage . . . .”84 Shia Muslims include these five 
pillars within their broader set of five principles and ten subsidiary 
pillars: “[Shia Islam’s] five principles are monotheism, justice, last 
judgment, prophethood, and imamate. Their subsidiary pillars include 
prayers, fasting, zakat, and pilgrimage, as well as jihad, directing others 
toward doing what is good, and avoiding what is evil . . . .”85 
As illustrated in Part I.A, Shia Muslims’ faith begins and ends with 
the divinity of the Prophet Muhammad’s family. Shia cosmology stems 
from the belief that the Prophet Muhammad explicitly named Ali as his 
successor.86 Although Abu Bakr assumed control of the political 
community following the Prophet Muhammad’s death, Shia Muslims 
set that matter aside with regard to the structure of their religious 
leadership, “the Imamite.”87 Premised upon the divinity of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s family, Shia Muslims hold Ali to be the first of twelve 
“infallible Imams.”88 Ali’s immediate successors were his two sons, 
Hassan and Hussein, who were followed by nine other figures that tie 
their familial ancestry back to the Prophet Muhammad in order to claim 
 
 82. HAMID ALGAR, WAHHABISM: A CRITICAL ESSAY 54 (2002).  
 83. “[D]uring the month of Ramadan, in the year 610, Prophet Muhammad received the first in 
a series of revelations that, together, constitute the Qur’an.” Saud, supra note 4, at 83.  
 84. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, WHAT IS AN AMERICAN MUSLIM?: EMBRACING FAITH AND 
CITIZENSHIP 91 (2014).  
 85. Id.  
 86. Shia scholars cite the Prophet Muhammad’s following support as unequivocal legal 
authority supporting the matter: “‘I am from Ali and Ali is from me; he is the guardian of every 
believer after me’ . . . ‘None but a believer loves Ali, and none but an apostate hates him.’” HAZLETON, 
supra note 5, at 35; see also NASR, supra note 7, at 37–38 (“The early Shias argued that the Prophet 
had chosen Ali as his successor and had made a testament to that effect, telling a congregation of 
Muslims at Ghadir Khumm, during his last pilgrimage to Mecca, that ‘whoever recognizes me as his 
master will recognize Ali as his master.’”).  
 87. Imamate is assigned with the role of spiritual leader, who is divinely connected to God and 
thus can render binding legal decisions, or fatwas (Arabic).  
 88. Religious leaders, Shiite Muslims believe, are chosen and divinely inspired by God. See 
generally MATTHEW PIERCE, TWELVE INFALLIBLE MEN: THE IMAMS AND THE MAKING OF SHI’ISM (2016) 
(providing a historical overview that profiles the twelve imams Shia Muslims hold in high esteem, 
with descriptive biographies of each).  
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divine authority as imams.89 The final prophet, Muhammad Al-Mahdi, 
holds considerable importance. Shia Muslims believe that the final 
imam is in occultation, or hiding, and will reveal himself and rule for a 
period of five, seven, nine, or nineteen years before the Day of 
Judgment.90 
Rejecting Shia Islam’s Imamite, Sunni Muslims believe in the 
succession and authority of the first four caliphs. Referred to reverently 
by Sunnis as the “rightly guided” caliphs of Islam, or the Rashidun,91 the 
successors of the Prophet Muhammad are also a source of divine 
authority. Reports of their lives, combined with the deeds, declarations, 
and model of the Prophet Muhammad, comprise the Sunnathe 
supplementary body of law that Sunni Muslims consult for spiritual 
guidance in conjunction with the Qur’an.92 For Sunni Islamic schools of 
thought, primary divine law starts and stops with the Qur’an and the 
Sunna. Unlike the Imam in Shia Islam, “[t]he caliph had no authority in 
and of himself; he only had authority insofar as he implemented the 
Qur’an and the sunna.”93 
On the other hand, Shia Muslims “see divine knowledge as 
continuing in the world after the Prophet’s death.”94 Shia Muslims 
follow the political and religious leadership of the Imam as they would 
the Prophet Muhammad.95 Consequently, Shia Muslims extend 
considerable authority to Imams to formulate and issue original legal 
edicts, or “fatwas.”96 Sunni Muslims consider the Shia concordance of 
divine and legal authority of the Imamite with the Prophet Muhammad 
to conflict with the latter’s supreme authoritative and divine position.97 
In fact, many Sunni Muslims view this to be a transgression of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s exclusive role as a divine messenger. 
Relatedly, Sunni Muslims maintain that legal revelation ended 
with the death of the Prophet Muhammad. In line with this view, Sunni 
imams are not divinely inspired figures like their Shia Muslim 
counterparts. Rather, they are tasked with leading worship services, 
occupy the role of community leader, and extend spiritual guidance to 
mosque congregations and community constituents. Sunni Muslim 
 
 89. After Hussein, the subsequent Imams, in order to succession, are: Ali Zainul-Abideen, 
Muhammad Al-Baqr, Jaafar Al-Saadiq, Musa Al-Kaazim, Ali Al-Raza, Muhammad Ali-Taqi, Ali  
Al-Naqi, Hasan Al-Askari, and Muhammad Al-Mahdi (the final Mahdi currently in occultation).  
 90. HEINZ HALM, THE SHI’ITESA SHORT HISTORY 34–37 (Allison Brown trans., Markus Wiener 
Publishers 2007).  
 91. Arabic.  
 92. Sunna is Arabic.  
 93. Saud, supra note 4, at 90.  
 94. Saud, supra note 4, at 85.  
 95. Saud, supra note 4, at 91.  
 96. Arabic. 
 97. In addition, “[f]or most Sunnis, worshipping at shrines, deifying Imams, and practicing 
Ashura rituals constitutes apostasy.” Oler, supra note 65, at 7.  
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Imams are mere mortals, while their Shia counterparts are believed to 
have a connection with God, and thus, afforded with the authority to 
make law. 
Comparatively, Sunni imams exercise considerably less legal 
authority than their Shia counterparts. This affords Sunni Muslims with 
greater latitude to interpret Islamic scripture in line with their 
subjective views relative to Shia Muslims, who are mandated to follow 
the unilateral interpretation of the Imam. This distinction has 
important political and religious ramifications. 
First, Shia Islam harmonizes political and religious authority, and 
centralizes both within the institution of the Imamite. The 
harmonization of faith and politics is manifested most vividly in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, a theocracy bestowing supreme religious and 
governmental authority to its clerics.98 
Second, Sunni Muslims reject the conflation of political with 
religious authority. Breaking from the Shia Muslim view that Imams 
rule by divine right, the Sunni caliphate fundamentally is a secular 
institution, ordained with the administrative task of implementing 
divine law.99 The consequence of this religious decentralization is 
considerable, both historically and contemporarily. By virtue of housing 
complete authority solely within the Imamite, Shia Muslim Imams also 
function as a moderating force on their followers by preempting 
countervailing or deviant interpretations of law. 
On the other hand, Sunni Islam affords its followers with greater 
interpretive freedom, and decentralization facilitates deviant or 
fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic scripture. Wahhabism, a 
minority Sunni tradition founded by the Arabian scholar Shaykh Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhab, and the chosen theology of transnational terror 
networks including Al Qaeda and ISIS, is a prime example.100 
2.   Wahhabism: Origins and Ideology 
Wahhabism, which followers refer to as “the asserters of the divine 
unity,”101 originated in 18th century Saudi Arabia. Founded by 
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, an Islamic scholar from “the small town 
of al-’Uyayna in Najd in the eastern part of what is today called the 
 
 98. For a concise and well outlined overview of the governmental structure and political system 
of Iran, see The Structure of Power in Iran, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/tehran/inside/govt.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). For a series of lectures by a prominent 
Islamic Law scholar examining the theocratic structure of Iran within the context of the Revolution 
that established it, see HAMID ALGAR, ROOTS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN (rev. ed. 2001). 
 99. Saud, supra note 4, at 90–91.  
 100. ALGAR, supra note 82, at 5. 
 101. Id. at 1. Many Wahhabis reject the Wahhabi designation, because it perceived as “a title 
given to the movement by those standing outside of it, often with pejorative intent.” Id.  
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Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,”102 this school of Sunni Islamic thought had 
little influence at its inception. However, al-Wahhab’s fortuitous 
partnership with the rulers of what would become the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia ultimately propelled Wahhabism onto the world stage.103 
The resonance and reach of Wahhabism today is almost entirely 
due to the rise and regional hegemony of the modern Saudi state. 
Wahhabism finds its ideology from two primary sources: first, the 
Kharijite movement, which originally branched off from both Sunni and 
Shia Islam; and second, the work of the 14th century Islamic scholar 
Ibn Taymiyya.104 
Following the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 A.D., the 
Kharijite movement established that “true religious authority is located 
exclusively in the timeless ideals of God and can never be found in 
humanity.”105 The Kharijites considered all forms of human 
interpretation of the Qur’an a derivation from faith. Any human beings 
who sought to interpret God’s “unambiguous” word in the Qur’an, 
including learned scholars, were categorically deemed “heretic” by the 
Kharijites.106 This rigid textualism later became a cornerstone of 
Wahhabi thought.107 The unbridled violence of Kharijites against  
non-abiding Muslims is a predecessor of modern analogs like ISIS.108 
In addition to the unwavering textualism of the Kharijites, Wahhab 
was also influenced heavily by Ibn Taymiyya. Echoing the Kharijites, 
the fundamentalist thinker unequivocally maintained the “absolute 
authority of a literal Qur’an, and any Muslim who steps outside that 
authority”109 was deemed an apostate. Ibn Taymiyya did not allow 
human interpretation in matters linked to Islamic jurisprudence, a 
position al-Wahhab later made his canon’s centerpiece. The Qur’an was 
unambiguous, Ibn Taymiyya argued, and his delight in polemics 
isolated Shia Muslims, Sufis, and Muslims that deviated from his 
narrow view to be legal objects of “jihad”or Islamically sanctioned 
war.110 
Like the Kharijites and Ibn Taymiyya, al-Wahhab mandated a 
“return to the pure and authentic Islam of the Founder [God], removing 
and where necessary destroying all the later accretions and 
 
 102. Id. at 5.  
 103. MADAWI AL-RASHEED, A HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 17–18 (2002).  
 104. For a biography of the scholar and a careful analysis of his ideas and works, see 4 STUDIES IN 
ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY: IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES (Yossef Rapoport & Shahab Ahmed eds., 2015).  
 105. Saud, supra note 4, at 87.  
 106. Saud, supra note 4, at 87. 
 107. Saud, supra note 4, at 88. 
 108. “The Kharijites raided towns and territories and subjected Muslims to inquisitions and 
persecutions. If Muslims were found not agreeing with them, they were summarily executed.” Saud, 
supra note 4, at 88. 
 109. Saud, supra note 4, at 88. 
 110. ALGAR, supra note 82, at 9. 
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distortions.”111 This call to action empowered al-Wahhab’s 
followersboth old and contemporaryto attack members of other 
faiths and Muslims who disagreed with his textual interpretations of the 
scripture. Shia Muslims were frequent targets of al-Wahhab’s textual 
reading of the Qur’an, and he branded them “faithless and, therefore, 
suitable targets for his purifying jihad.”112 In short, Wahhabism teaches 
Muslims to kill Muslims who deviate from his interpretation of the 
scripture.113 
Therefore, Wahhabism’s categorical prohibition of ritualism 
manifests Sunni Islam’s displeasure with ritualism at its extreme: 
“[P]erhaps the most vivid distinctionand one that grates on Sunni 
sensibilitiesis the love of visual imagery evident in Shia popular 
devotionalism. Sunnism tends to frown on the visual arts as possible 
inducements to, if not outright expressions of, idol worship.”114 In 
addition to this ritualism, Wahhabis also consider the reverence for 
Imams to be in violation of the core tenets of the Qur’an.115 Therefore, 
Shia Muslims are routinely branded as apostates by Wahhabis and are 
guilty of “innovating” beliefs and practices that lack textual basis.116 
Because of this view, Shia Muslimswho comprise fifteen percent of 
the population in Saudi Arabiaare the subjects of Wahhabi 
subjugation in Saudi Arabia,117 and the targets of violence inflicted by 
transnational terror networks driven by the faith.118 
Although Wahhabism is a “marginal” tradition among Sunni 
Muslims,119 it now holds far-reaching geopolitical and critical national 
security importance. First, as illustrated in Part II, Wahhabism is the 
religious and “ideological cornerstone of the Saudi movement,”120 the 
regional Sunni Muslim superpower in the Mideast.121 
 
 111. BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM: HOLY WAR AND UNHOLY TERROR 120 (2003). 
 112. Donald W. Garner and Robert L. McFarland, Suing Islam: Tort, Terrorism and the House 
of Saud, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 223, 225 (2007) (citing AL-RASHEED, supra note 103) (emphasis added). 
 113. See generally ALGAR, supra note 82. 
 114. NASR, supra note 7, at 44.  
 115. ALGAR, supra note 82, at 33. Most notably, Wahhabis also consider the Shia belief that 
Imams, starting with Ali and concluding with al-Mahdi, infringe on the “Seal of All Revelation,” or 
the foundational Islamic tenet that the Prophet Muhammad is the final messenger of God. MARC 
SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 4 (2004).  
 116. Bid’a is the Arabic word for innovation, which is used pejoratively by Wahhabis to 
delegitimize Shia Muslims as authentic believers.  
 117. Frederic Wehrey, Saudi Arabia Has a Shiite Problem, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 3, 2014), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/03/saudi-arabia-has-a-shiite-problem-royal-family-saud.  
 118. ALGAR, supra note 82, at 8–9. ISIS classifies Shia Muslims as rafiduun, the Arabic word for 
apostate, and because of this, systematically targets and executes Shia Muslims.  
 119. ALGAR, supra note 82, at 2. 
 120. Saud, supra note 4, at 89. 
 121. The earliest descendant of the House of Saud, which would eventually become the ruling 
family of the modern Saudi Arabia state, brokered a historic pact with al-Wahhab in 1744.  
AL-RASHEED, supra note 103, at 17–18. This pact had a transformative, twofold impact: first, it 
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Second, Wahhabi thought inspires the transnational terror 
networks believed to incite the recent terror attacks in the U.S. and 
Europe.122 DHS counter-radicalization leadership believes that “Radical 
Islamist Terror” groups deploy this fundamentalist school of Sunni 
Islam to “inspire individuals to commit acts of violence”123 and launch 
“warfare” against “disbelievers.”124 While deemed a Sunni Muslim 
phenomenon by DHS, as examined in Part III.A, homegrown 
radicalization more accurately is a worldview wedded to the rigid tenets 
of Wahhabism and the transnational terror networks driven by it.125 
C. MUSLIM SECTARIANISM IN THE UNITED STATES. 
1.   A Demographic Snapshot 
Islam is the second largest and fastest growing religion in the 
world.126 At 1.8 billion adherents, Islam is forecasted to surpass the 
number of Christians in the world “by the end of the century.”127 
Roughly eighty-seven to ninety percent of the global Muslim population 
identify as Sunnis, while ten to thirteen percent subscribe to the Shia 
tradition.128 Sunni Muslims are prominent throughout Muslim-majority 
nations, but “most Shias (between sixty-eight and eighty percent) live in 
just four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India, and Iraq,”129 with a prominent 
population in Lebanon.130 Therefore, Shia Muslims are greatly 
outnumbered by their Sunni Muslim counterparts, who are also 
 
legitimized the ruling family’s takeover of political rule, which continues in modern Saudi Arabia; 
and second, it enshrined Wahhabism as the official law of the modern Saudi state. GILLES KEPEL, 
JIHAD: THE TRAIL OF POLITICAL ISLAM 50–51 (Anthony F. Roberts trans., The Belknap Press of Harv. 
U. Press 2002). 
 122. SAGEMAN, supra note 115, at 72 (providing an analysis of how Wahhabi and Salafi thought 
drive modern terrorist networks, most notably Al Qaeda).  
 123. Identifying the Enemy: Radical Islamist Terror, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec., Subcomm. on Oversight & Mgmt. Efficiency, 114th Cong. (2016) (written statement 
of George Selim, Dir., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Office for Cmty. P’ships). 
 124. ALGAR, supra note 82, at 34. “The corollary of identifying Muslims other than the Wahhabis 
as mushrikeen [disbelievers] was that warfare against them became not simply permissible but 
obligatory: their blood could legitimately be shed, their property was forfeit, and their women and 
children could be enslaved.” ALGAR, supra note 82, at 34. 
 125. Shane, supra note 28.  
 126. Lipka, supra note 77.  
 127. Lipka, supra note 77. 
 128. Mapping the Global Muslim Population, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2009), 
www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/.  
 129. Id. 
 130. See generally RULA JURDI ABISAAB & MALEK ABISAAB, THE SHI’ITES OF LEBANON: MODERNISM, 
COMMUNISM, AND HIZBULLAH’S ISLAMISTS (2014), which provides a thorough cultural and political 
history of the Shia in Lebanon, including a contemporary analysis Hizbullah’s role in both domestic and 
regional politics. Forty percent of the Lebanese population follows Shia Islam. Yusri Hazran, The Shiite 
Community in Lebanon: From Marginalization to Ascendency, 37 MIDDLE EAST BRIEF 2 (2009).  
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prominently represented in Muslim-majority nations throughout the 
world. 
Sunni Islam is also the predominant sect observed among Muslim 
Americans.131 “Sixty-five percent [of Muslim Americans] identify as 
Sunnis and 11% as Shias.”132 The remainder select the generic,  
non-affiliated “just a Muslim” title.133 Shia Islam is the minority sect in 
the U.S., just as it is everywhere else in the world except Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq. The demographic dominance of Sunni Muslims 
feeds the misconception that Sunni Muslim populations, practices and 
beliefs define the whole of Islam, which oftentimes brings about 
discursive erasure of Shia Islam and other minority traditions. 
In line with sectarian demographics, the vast majority of the 2106 
mosques in the U.S. follow the Sunni Muslim tradition.134 More often 
than not, these mosques are also segregated through narrow, specific 
sectarian schools of thought. While earlier generations of Muslim 
immigrant populations avoided worshipping in sect-specific mosques, 
the financial stability of early Shia Muslim Americans combined with 
“the growth in Shiite populations as immigrants flee[ing] persecution in 
Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan” spurred 
demand for standalone Shia Muslim mosques.135 
In light of this unprecedented influx of Shia newcomers, “[o]ver 
44% of all Shi’ite mosques were established in the decade of the 
1990s,”136 which reflects Shia Islam’s comparatively less-established 
presence in the U.S. The growth of Shia Muslim mosques in the U.S. 
was a salient development: integrated mosques gradually gave way to 
mosques segregated along sectarian lines, which engendered division 
along those very boundaries. 
After 9/11, mosques of both sects became a focal point for DHS 
surveillance and monitoring.137 Although both federal and local law 
enforcement made the wholesale assessment that many mosques were 
 
 131. The Pew Research Center estimated that the Muslim American population stood at 3.3 million. 
Besheer Mohamed, A New Estimate of the U.S. Muslim Population, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/06/a-new-estimate-of-the-u-s-muslim-population/. 
However, that figure is believed to be grossly underestimated, with the highest projections at eight 
million. Beydoun, supra note 35, at 1463.  
 132. Muslim-American Demographics Reveal a Diverse Group That Rejects Categorization, 
HUFF. POST: RELIGION (Mar. 26, 2014, 10:23 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/26/ 
muslim-american-demographics_n_5027866.html. 
 133. Lipka, supra note 77. 
 134. IHSAN BAGBY, THE AMERICAN MOSQUE 2011: REPORT NUMBER 1 FROM THE US MOSQUE STUDY 
2011 (2012).  
 135. Sacirbey, supra note 78.  
 136. BAGBY, supra note 134, at 4.  
 137. See Matthew A. Wasserman, First Amendment Limitations on Police Surveillance: The 
Case of the Muslim Surveillance Program, 90 N.Y.U L. REV. 1786, 1791 (2015) (discussing the New 
York City Police Department’s (“NYPD”) “Muslim Surveillance Program” implemented after the 9/11 
terror attacks, which preceded DHS’s national counter-radicalization program). 
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preaching fundamentalist Islam, the majority of Sunni Muslim mosques 
in the U.S. follow “the more flexible approach of looking to 
interpretations of Quran and Sunnah (the normative practice of 
Prophet Muhammad) . . . .”138 One to three percent of Sunni Muslim 
mosques adopt Salafismthe textual iteration of Sunni Islam linked to 
Wahhabism,139 the school of thought enshrined by the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, and the driving force behind the apocalyptic ambitions of 
“Radical Islamist Terror” networks like ISIS to inspire, and enlist, 
homegrown radicals in the U.S.140 Radicals that not only threaten 
broader national security concerns,141 but from the perspective of Shia 
Muslims in the U.S., the safety of their community of followers at home 
and abroad.142 
Despite both sects being targets of state suspicion and private 
backlash after 9/11, the rift between Sunni and Shia Muslims began to 
intensify during this period. The war in Iraq,143 followed by other 
regional conflicts in the coming years, most notably strife in Syria,144 
exacerbated tensions in the region as well as inflamed the sectarian 
divide among Muslims in the U.S. Shia Muslims contend that inflamed 
sectarianism stateside also spurred the spread of Shia-phobiaat at the 
hands of Sunni Muslims. 
2.   “Shia-phobia” and Sectarian Tension in the United States 
“Shiaphobia”the belief that Shia Muslims are illegitimate 
Muslims or apostates, typically by conservative Sunni Muslim 
groupswhich results in legal subjugation and/or private 
discrimination of Shia Muslim individuals and populations.145 Rhetoric 
scholar Shereen Yousuf defines Shiaphobia by its various deployments 
on geo-socio-political levels, and then categorizes them into different 
 
 138. BAGBY, supra note 134, at 4. 
 139. “The Salafiyya had, after all, certain elements in common with Wahhabism, above all 
disdain for all developments subsequent to al-Salaf al Salib . . .” (“The Righteous Ancestors,” 
generally taken to be the first two generations of Islam). ALGAR, supra note 82, at 47.  
 140. Selim, supra note 123, at 1.  
 141. Selim, supra note 123, at 1.  
 142. Shia Rights Watch is the leading Shia Muslim American nonprofit organization tracking the 
incidence of anti-Shia violence in the U.S. and abroad. See SHIA RIGHTS WATCH, 
www.shiarightswatch.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).  
 143. Neil MacFarquhar, Iraq’s Shadow Widens Sunni-Shiite Split in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb.  
4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/us/04muslim.html.  
 144. For a primer on the War in Syria, see Why Is There a War in Syria?, BBC NEWS (Apr.  
7, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229.  
 145. The judging of whether one is Muslim or not is called tafkirism (Arabic); see also Eldar 
Mamedov, The Scourge of Shiaphobia, MUFTAH (Aug. 19, 2014), https://muftah.org/ 
scourge-shiaphobia/#.Wi92d0qnE2w (defining Shia-phobia as “the religious, political, economic 
and social discrimination against Shias, followers of a minority Islamic sect who are seen by the 
Saudi state and Wahhabi religious establishment as heretics, traitors to ‘true Islam,’ and Iranian 
agents.” Id.).  
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clusters, including “attacks on those perceived to be Shi’i” and attacks on 
“places that occupy significance to Shi’i theology in particular . . . .”146 
While more pervasive in the Mideast and Muslim-majority 
nations,147 the intensification of sectarian tension in the U.S., impacted 
by rising hostilities in the Mideast, has given rise to Shiaphobia 
stateside. Some forms of Shiaphobia are less menacing and more 
institutionalized, for example, when “Zaytuna College is becoming a  
US-accredited liberal arts college that offers a BA in Islamic Law and 
Theology without including Shi’i jurisprudence in their curriculum,”148 
while more menacing forms involve physical violence inflicted on Shia 
Muslims or places of worship by Sunni Muslims.149 Therefore, in 
addition to being exposed to broader forms of Islamophobia,150 Shia 
Muslims in the U.S. are also vulnerable to the Shiaphobic attitudes and 
discrimination (sometimes) inflicted by extreme Sunni Muslim actors. 
Tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslim Americans are fluid. 
Rising and falling in reflection of political circumstances in the Mideast, 
which are climaxing to frightening heights with the Iran-Saudi Arabia 
proxy wars in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria.151 Part II examines how the rising 
strife between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both attempting to expand their 
spheres of influence in the Mideast, has intensified hostility among Shia 
and Sunni Muslims in the U.S. and polarized them more than ever 
before. 
While the rising tide of Islamophobia has left both Sunni and Shia 
Muslim vulnerable to “private Islamopobia”152 and to varying degrees, 
 
 146. Shereen Yousuf, Right to Offense, Right to Shiaphobia: A Rhetorical Analysis of Yasir 
Qadhi’s Framings of Offense, 9 J. SHI’A ISLAMIC STUD. 39, 43 (2016). Yousuf explains the salience of 
this cluster of Shiaphobia: “Being targeted for commemorative practices is worthy of being 
designated its own cluster given the prevalence and degree to which anti Shi’i aggression is centered 
around them, and is therefore deserving of its own space its own space to discuss the trajectories 
surrounding these practices, and resistance against them” Id. at 44.  
 147. Particularly in nations like Saudi Arabia, where rigid and austere schools of Sunni thought 
steer government and law, and bring about the subordination and persecution of Shia minority 
groups within the country.  
 148. Yousuf, supra note 146, at 44–45.  
 149. One example came out of Dearborn, Michigan: 
Shiite mosques and businesses in the Detroit area were vandalized in January, and a 
Shiite restaurant owner said he’d received a threatening call mentioning his sect. 
Authorities have yet to identify the vandals. But some Shiite Muslims told local news 
media they believe Sunnis were behind the broken windows and graffiti because Shiites 
had celebrated publicly when former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, was executed 
in December by Iraq’s Shiite-led government.  
Cathy Lynn Grossman, Tensions Between Sunnis, Shiites Emerging in USA, USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2007, 
10:49 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2007-09-24-muslim-tension_N.htm.  
 150. Beydoun, supra note 25, at 114.  
 151. Henry Johnson, This Map Explains the Saudi-Iran Proxy War, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan.  
16, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/06/this-map-explains-the-saudi-iran-proxy-war/.  
 152. Private Islamophobia is, “the fear, suspicion, and violent targeting of Muslims by individuals 
or private actors. This animus is generally carried forward by nonstate actors’ use of religious or 
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“structural Islamophobia,”153the galvanizing force of (sectarian-blind) 
Islamophobia has been eclipsed by the polarizing effect of foreign 
strife.154 “‘We’re good at interfaith work but not intra-faith work,’” 
observes Sayed Mohammad Jawad al-Qazwini, one of the most 
prominent Shia Imams in the U.S.155 In the era of counter-radicalization 
policing, this opens the door for DHS to capitalize on sectarian rifts as 
counterterror opportunitybisecting American Islam into prospective 
enemies, for Sunni Muslims; and prospective informants, for Shia 
Muslims. Furthermore, Shia-phobia also primes Shia Muslims to work 
against those who perpetuate it, and in some instances, collaborate with 
law enforcement to push forward CVE policing against them. 
As explored below in Part II, the DOS has exploited sectarian 
divide in the Mideast to push forward an American agenda. A  
well-suited strategy for advancing domestic national security aims, and 
as analyzed in Part III, a conducive paradigm for recruiting Muslims to 
serve on the “front line” in the fight against homegrown terror, or 
radicalization.156 
II.  SECTARIANISM AS FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY 
U.S. foreign policy has long capitalized on sectarian rifts and 
tensions in the Mideast to expand its sphere of influence in the region 
and carry forward its economic and political interests. The DOS has also 
descended upon theatres of sectarian strife to identify new foreign 
policy opportunities, and in some instances, its maneuvering has 
intensified sectarian hostilities among Muslim-majority states and  
non-state actors. For Washington, D.C. officials steering foreign policy 
in the Mideast, a region imagined to be at perpetual war,157 sectarian 
fault lines have been seized as fruitful sources for springing American 
interests forward. A sectarian strategy has certainly shifted over time, 
and changes with each presidential administration. Yet, as witnessed in 
 
racial slurs, mass protests . . . or violence against Muslim subjects.” Beydoun, supra note 25, at 111. 
 153. “The fear and suspicion of Muslims on the part of institutionsmost notably, government 
agenciesthat is manifested through the enactment and advancement of policies.” Beydoun, supra 
note 25, at 114. 
 154. “[H]ate crimes against American Muslims were up 78 percent over the course of 2015,” with 
estimates of 260 hates crimes against Muslims across the country. Eric Lichtblau, Hate Crimes 
Against American Muslims Most Since Post-9/11 Era, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/us/politics/hate-crimes-american-muslims-rise.html. “That 
was the most since the record 481 documented hate crimes against Muslims in 2001, when the Sept. 
11 attacks set off waves of crimes targeting Muslims and Middle Easterners . . . .” Id.  
 155. Sacirbey, supra note 78. 
 156. Second Debate, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting Hillary Clinton).  
 157. For a recent illustration of this trope, see Letters: End Futile Wars in Middle East, CHI. SUN 
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2016, 4:22 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/letters-end-futile-middle-
east-wars/ (“That vicious circle of perpetual war promotes and guarantees blowback in the form of 
suicide bombings or suicidal shooting rampages that can never be completely stopped.”).  
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the last two decades, sectarian divides and tensions have become a 
more potent source for the DOS to pit nations in the Mideast against 
one another, keep the region divided, and carry forward its interests. 
This Part provides an overview of U.S. foreign policy strategy in the 
Mideast, focusing mainly on how that policy navigated and negotiated 
sectarian dynamics in the region. At the earliest stages, outlined in 
Subpart A, narrow economic interest in Saudi oil guided DOS 
intervention in the region, which seeded the more robust and broader 
engagement that followed. Subpart B examines the subsequent phase, 
which witnessed the rise of sectarian saber-rattling and strife ushered in 
by the Shia takeover of Iran, and deepening American allegiance with 
Saudi Arabia and the fundamentalist brand of Sunni Islam, 
Wahhabism, it enshrines. Finally, Subpart C analyzes the modern 
impasse of normalizing relations with Shia Iran under the Obama 
Administration, and perhaps, retrenching devotion to a Wahhabi Saudi 
state with ideological and alleged financial ties to Al Qaeda, ISIS and 
transnational terror networks believed to inspire homegrown 
radicalization in the U.S. 
A. SAUDI ARABIA AND THE U.S.: A COVENANT SOURCED BY OIL 
World War II catapulted the U.S. into the global superpower it is 
today. American engagement on two fronts, particularly Europe, 
solidified the nation’s role and reputation as the “arsenal of democracy 
that armed the Allies and defeated the Axis.”158 Emerging into the 
arsenal that helped stave off Nazi fascism in Europe, however, may not 
have been possible without the nascent monarchy in the Mideast to fuel 
it. The United States needed an endless supply of oil to mount its front 
against Nazi Germany in Europe and its campaign against Japan in the 
Pacific, which it eventually found in the very Peninsula where Islam was 
revealed roughly fourteen centuries earlier. 
Six years before the beginning of World War II, American oil 
companies forged business relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
to extract and refine oil. Two years later, in 1935, “phenomenal reserves 
of oil were found in Dammam, in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. 
This was miles away from the future headquarters of the Arabian 
American Oil Company (Aramco) in Dhahran,”159 the partnership that 
forms the foundation of the eighty-one year political alliance between 
the U.S. and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
At its outset, the Saudi-American covenant bound by oil was purely 
economic. American oil companies sourced seemingly infinite supplies 
 
 158. ARTHUR HERMAN, FREEDOM’S FORGE: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESS PRODUCED VICTORY IN WORLD 
WAR II xiii (2012).  
 159. Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of Arab American 
Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29, 69 (2013).  
BEYDOUN-69.2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2018  10:20 AM 
February 2018]                 BISECTING AMERICAN ISLAM? 455 
of crude oil to meet escalating demand at home. The Saudis were 
fortunate to discover the “largest known petroleum reserves in the 
world”160 but lacked the human capital and infrastructure to refine, 
transport and “convert Arabian crude to marketable products,” became 
completely reliant on the American oil companies.161 The partnership 
proved wildly lucrative for “the consortium of four American firms 
(Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, and Texaco) that enjoyed exclusive rights to 
Saudi oil, [which] reaped three times the profits enjoyed by the Saudi 
government in 1949.”162 The economic benefits trickled back to the U.S. 
government, which “made more off Saudi oil than did the Saudis 
themselves.”163 Consequently, blurring the lines between lucrative 
economic partnership and political ally, establishing Saudi Arabia’s 
vitality to broader State Department interests in the region. Oil was not 
only big business, but at an impasse when American hegemony was met 
with Soviet competition for the hearts and minds of states in the 
Mideast (and everywhere else),164 oil was everything. 
This U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia spawned an early alignment 
with Sunni Islam and the Wahhabi school of thought enshrined into 
Saudi law.165 On February 20, 1945, President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt met with Saudi King Abdul Aziz aboard an American warship 
near Egypt. The meeting marked the “first time a U.S. president met a 
Saudi king,” which signaled the maturation of a once purely economic 
partnership into full-fledged political fidelity.166 
Saudi Arabia was, at once, both the leading global supplier of crude 
oil and a nation-state at the crossroads of Africa, Asia and the Mideast. 
Indeed, “[the] free flow of oil from the region . . . is a central goal for the 
United States in the region,”167 materialized primarily from its alliance 
with Saudi Arabia. But the Kingdom’s geographic location and 
geopolitical value was also of great importance to the U.S., particularly 
because of its adjacency to other oil-producing giants (Iraq and Iran), 
its unique alliance with Israel, and the threat of Soviet influence 
creeping into the region. 
 
 160. Frank J. Mirkow, The Nature of Saudi Arabian Strategic Power: Implications for 
American Foreign Policy, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 157, 159 (1993).  
 161. EUGENE ROGAN, THE ARABS: A HISTORY 356 (2009).  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 321–22 (the Soviet Union established strong relations with Egypt and Syria in the 
early 1950’s, two pivotal nation in the region that embraced socialism and viewed American 
capitalism, and interest in the region, with great suspicion).  
 165. Wahhabism, “prescribes a return to the basic teachings and traditions of Islam as a solution 
to the Kingdom’s perceived problems.” Mirkow, supra note 160, at 161.  
 166. Adam Taylor, The First Time a U.S. President Met a Saudi King, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/01/27/the-first-time-a-u-s-
president-met-a-saudi-king/?utm_term=.69568d4a8051.  
 167. Mirkow, supra note 160, at 163–64. 
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As a result, the Saudi-American partnership evolved into an 
unwavering seventy-one year alliance between two dramatically 
different governments. This period witnessed the U.S. indirectly 
endorsing and facilitating the propagation of Wahhabism within Saudi 
governmental halls of power. The comprehensive alliance forged by 
American patronage of Saudi oil bolstered the political influence of 
ruling Wahhabis, which was particularly visible in their judiciary: 
All judges (over 700) are Wahhabi, and the minister of justice is 
always a senior member of the Wahhabi hierarchy. The courts subject 
all legal decisions to a narrow and selective interpretation of the 
Koran and the Sunna, based solely on Wahhabi scholars’ 
interpretation of al-Wahhab and of wider Hanbali Islamic thought.168 
In addition to the courts, Wahhabis exercise dominant influence 
over the cabinet, Saudi police forces, and the Ministry of Education.169 
Therefore, “Wahhabi clerics are continually indulged as the kingdom’s 
de facto rulers.”170 
Wahhabi clerics’ unrivaled influence within Saudi Arabia 
subsequently gave rise to the state’s mission to export the 
fundamentalist Sunni school of thought abroad. If Saudi oil was the 
cornerstone of its economy, then Wahhabism was the crux of its foreign 
policy dawa,171 or mission to globally export its brand of conservative 
brand of Islam globally: 
[T]he Saudi ministry for religious affairs printed and distributed 
millions of Korans free of charge, along with Wahhabite doctrinal 
texts, among the world’s mosques, from the African plains to the rice 
paddies of Indonesia and the Muslim immigrant high-rise housing 
projects of European cities. For the first time in fourteen centuries, 
the same books (as well as cassettes) could be found from one end of 
the Umma to the other; all came from the same Saudi distribution 
circuits, as part of an identical corpus. Its very limited number of 
titles hewed to the same doctrinal line and excluded other currents of 
thought that had formerly been part of a more pluralistic Islam.172 
The Saudi mission of exporting Wahhabism helped destabilize the 
region, spur the persecution of Shia Muslims (and other groups) in 
nations where Wahhabi Islam was introduced, and spawned the growth 
of transnational terror networks including Al Qaeda and ISIS, which 
inspires Muslim radicalization in the U.S. and globally173 Saudi’s 
mission to export Wahhabi Islam was also motivated to counter the 
 
 168. Mai Yamani, The Two Faces of Saudi Arabia, 50 SURVIVAL 143, 146 (2008). 
 169. “Saudi Arabia’s government controls and regulates all education, public and private, in the 
country. The Saudi educational program is mandatory and explicitonly Sunni Wahhabism can be 
taught in Saudi schools.” Garner & McFarland, supra note 112, at 238.  
 170. Yamani, supra note 168, at 146.  
 171. The Arabic word for the missionary call to Islam, or missionary work.  
 172. KEPEL, supra note 121, at 72.  
 173. ALGAR, supra note 98, at 69.  
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influence of Iran, which emerged as its chief regional and sectarian rival 
after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. This rivalry continues today and is 
probably tenser than ever.174 
B. BETWEEN COLD WAR AND SHIA THREAT 
1.   Revolutionary Iran: The Rise of a Shiite Islamic Power 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 altered the geopolitical landscape 
in the Mideast.175 The Shia Islamic theocracy installed by the 
charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini, who immediately declared “America is 
the Great Satan” after taking power from the U.S.-backed Shah,176 
elevated Shia Islam into the new image of Islamic evil. For the Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who “grasped that Karbala was an enormously loaded 
symbol,” he used the narrative to brand the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as 
the modern enforcers of oppression on Muslims, in the region and the 
world at large.177 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran dealt, at once, a double blow to 
American interests in the region. First, it unseated Shah Mohamed Reza 
Pahlevi, a monarch keen on steering clear from religion and deepening 
relations with the U.S., from power.178 
Second, it implemented a Shia Islamic theocracy in his place, 
marking the first time Shia Muslims had modern control of a nation 
state. Khomeini’s victory sent deep and transformative reverberations 
throughout the Shia Muslim world. It also garnered instant allegiance 
from Shia Muslims populations in between India and Lebanon179 and 
from the vantage point of Saudi monarchy sitting across the Persian 
Gulf, an upstart Shia Muslim power that would rival its regional 
authority. 
 
 174. See Vali Nasr, The War for Islam, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 22, 2016, 1:17 PM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/22/the-war-for-islam-sunni-shiite-iraq-syria/.  
 175. “The Islamic Revolution was one of the most significant events of the Cold War era, for it 
profoundly altered the balance of power in the Middle East as the United States lost one of its pillars 
of influence in the region.” ROGAN, supra note 161, at 393. For a historic account of the elements that 
gave rise to the Iranian Revolution, with specific attention to the convergence of distinct elements of 
Iranian society that formed the popular revolution, most notably secularists and “Islamists,” see 
KEPEL, supra note 121, at 106–13.  
 176. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Speech, American Plots Against Iran (Nov. 5, 1979) 
(transcript available at https://web.archive.org/web/20160522133828/http://emam.com/posts/ 
view/15718/Speech/). 
 177. HAZLETON, supra note 5, at 197.  
 178. The Shah had been visiting the United States continuously since this accession to power in 
1941. “In the American press at that time an interesting series of photographs appeared that showed 
the Shah in friendly conversation with every American president since Truman.” ALGAR, supra note 
98, at 121.  
 179. “The Iranian Revolution and the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979 transformed Shiite 
politics in Lebanon. The Shiites of Lebanon were bound to Iran by common religious and cultural 
ties that spanned the centuries.” ROGAN, supra note 161, at 412.  
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The rise of Khomeini and Iran instantly converted the secular 
American ally in the region into an Islamic enemy and Shia menace. 
The months following Iran’s transition from Shah-led monarchy to 
Shia-inspired theocracy elevated Khomeini’s stature, and vis-à-vis, his 







When the U.S. government allowed the deposed shah into the United 
States for medical treatment (he was terminally ill with cancer), a 
group of Iranian students overran the American Embassy in Tehran 
and took fifty-two American diplomats hostage on November 4, 1979. 
U.S. President Jimmy Carter froze Iranian assets, applied economic 
and political sanctions on the Islamic Republic, and even attempted 
an aborted military rescue mission to relieve the hostage crisisto no 
avail. The American government was powerless and humiliated as its 
diplomats were held captive for 444 days.180 
The Iran hostage crisis cost President Carter the presidency in 
1980.181 And by challenging the U.S., it elevated Khomeini’s stature 
within the global Shia Muslim population. Iran’s rise in 1979 and 
expanding influence in the years that followed was the momentous 
victory that long eluded Shia Muslims, which helped elevate their 
marginal statuses in their respective homelands and propelled Shia 
Islam as a political power in the Mideast. 
The threat posed by Iran was also felt within the bounds of Saudi 
Arabia. Inspired by the Iranian Revolution, “Saudi Arabia’s Shiite 
community in the Eastern Province rose in violent demonstrations on 
November 27 [1979], carrying portraits of the spiritual leader of Iran’s 
revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, and distributing leaflets calling for the 
overthrow of the ‘despotic’ Saudi regime.”182 In three days, the Saudi 
government violently suppressed the protests, leaving scores of Shia 
Saudis dead and maimed.183 The message from Tehran to Riyadh and 
Washington, D.C. was loud and clear: Iran was far more than a nation 
that stood in between American and Saudi interests in the region, it was 
an orchestrator of a Shia movement that positioned the U.S. and its 
Sunni ally as sworn enemies. 
Consequently, in order to counter expanding Iranian influence in 
the region, particularly nations with prominent Shia Muslims nations, 
 
 180. ROGAN, supra note 161, at 413.  
 181. KEPEL, supra note 121, at 114.  
 182. ROGAN, supra note 161, at 394.  
 183. ROGAN, supra note 161, at 394. 
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the U.S. deepened its allegiance to Saudi Arabia and its broader regional 
alignment with Sunni Islamic or secular governments. The U.S. publicly 
backed Saddam Hussein, who helmed a secular state, in Iraq’s  
eight-year-long war with Iran (1980–1988) by financing and arming the 
dictator.184 While “Ayatollah Khomeini was urging the Shiis of Iraq to 
revolt, even to kill him [Saddam Hussein][,]”185 the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia backed (the secularist) Hussein in order to stave off Iranian 
expansion into the Arab World.186 The eight-year war, however, would 
only politically mobilize Shia Muslim communities in Iraq and beyond. 
Giving rise to proxy militias and parties such as Hezbollah in Lebanon 
in the early 1980s,187 and the Houthis in Yemen in the 1990s.188 
As a result, the turnover of power in Iraq to a Shia Muslim majority 
stretched the sphere of Iranian influence as far west as the Levant and 
into the southernmost reaches of the Arabian Peninsula. The Shia 
Islamic threat was on the Saudi state’s doorstep and firmly steeped in 
strategic corners that jeopardized American regional interests and 
propagated the narrative of Shia oppression and the possibility of 
sectarian strife. 
2.   Saudi Arabia: An Ally on Two Fronts 
The unexpected rise of Iran in the 1980s pushed the DOS to invest 
even more heavily into Saudi Arabia, its longtime ally and regional 
Sunni foe. The emergence of Iran and its expanding appeal throughout 
the region bolstered the DOS “strategy of instrumentalizing sectarian 
 
 184. WILLIAM R. POLK, UNDERSTANDING IRAQ: THE WHOLE SWEEP OF IRAQUI HISTORY, FROM 
GENGHIS KHAN’S MONGOLS TO THE OTTOMAN TURKS TO THE BRITISH MANDATE TO THE AMERICAN 
OCCUPATION 189 (2005).  
 185. Id. at 129.  
 186. “[T]op officials in the Reagan administration saw Saddam as a useful surrogate. By going to 
war with Iran, he could bleed the radical mullahs who had seized control of Iran from the  
pro-American shah.” Christopher Dickey & Evan Thomas, How the US Helped Create Saddam 
Hussein, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Sept. 23, 2002), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/ 
article/167/34978.html.  
  187. Robert F. Worth, Hezbollah’s Rise amid Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/weekinreview/16worth.html?mcubz=3; see also KEPEL, supra 
note 121, at 123–24 (“The Iranian revolution’s heaviest impact . . . [was in] Lebanon.”).  
 188.  
The Huthi movement’s origins lie in the Shabab al-Mumanin (the Believing Youth), which 
began in the early 1990s as a summer school program using modern meansvideos and 
cassette recordingsto promote Zaydism [a branch of Shia Islam] among the literate 
youth of the north who had largely forgotten their ancestors’ religion.  
Charles Schmitz, The Huthi Ascent to Power, MIDDLE EAST INST. (Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://www.mei.edu/content/at/huthi-ascent-power. “The Believing Youth worked to raise 
awareness about the Zaydi branch of Shiite Islam, which had dominated Yemen for centuries but was 
sidelined after a civil war in the 1960s and repressed by the Yemeni government.” Adam Taylor, Who 
Are the Houthis, the Group That Just Toppled Yemen’s Government?, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/01/22/who-are-the-houthis-the-
group-that-just-toppled-yemens-government/.  
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differences to forge a regional alliance against Iran.”189 Saudi Arabia, 
the regional fulcrum of Sunni Muslim power, boasted the military,190 
spiritual,191 and economic prowess to contain Iranian influence and 
Iran’s intent to broaden the arc of the “Shia crescent.”192 Through Saudi 
Arabia, which leveraged petro-dollars and Wahhabism to extend its 
influence throughout the Arab and Muslim Worlds, American interests 
were consequently advanced in the face of their mutual Iranian rival. 
In addition to jostling with Iran, Saudi Arabia served an integral 
role in curbing Soviet ambitions in the region. Throughout the 1980s, 
the Reagan Administration collaborated with the King Fahd-led 
monarchy of Saudi Arabia to rebuff Soviet aspirations on the outskirts 
of the Arab World. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia jointly bankrolled 
Afghani Mujahedeen in their war against the Soviet Union.193 Afghan 
jihad was celebrated as noble by Ronald Reagan194 because it aligned 
with American geopolitical interests.195 Yet jihad retained its menacing 
imagery when tied to the Shia people and government of Iran, 
illustrating the influence of Saudi Wahhabism on American foreign 
policy in the 1980s. 
American support of Saudi Arabia and its exportation of 
Wahhabism facilitated the rise of the transnational terror networks that 
inspire Muslim radicalization today. The Mujahideen, which kept the 
rival Soviets out of Afghanistan, gave rise to the Talbanwhich 
enshrined Wahhabism as the law of the land in Afghanistan. During the 
1990s and the 2000s, the Taliban collaborated closely with Al Qaeda 
 
 189. Shireen Hunter, Sunni-Shia Tensions Are More About Politics, Power and Privilege than 
Theology, PRINCE ALWALEED BIN TALAL CTR. MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING, 
https://acmcu.georgetown.edu/sunni-shia-tensions (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).  
 190. “Saudi Arabia possesses one of the most technologically advanced armed forces in the 
region, if not the world. It has drawn high technology armaments from powers such as the United 
States and France in addition to Silkworm missiles from the People’s Republic of China.” Mirkow, 
supra note 160, at 158.  
 191. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s title as “Custodian of the Two Holy Places [Mecca and 
Medina] . . . . [is] an essential instrument of hegemony over Islam.” KEPEL, supra note 121, at 75.  
 192. Yamani, supra note 168, at 151. “[A] term first articulated by Jordan’s King Abdullah in 
2003,” to explain Iran’s expanding influence in the region, particularly Iraq after the downfall of 
Saddam, and the bridge the subsequent Shia-majority government of Iraq established with the Shia 
populations in the Levant. Id. (citing Robin Wright & Peter Baker, Iraq, Jordan See Threat to 
Election from Iran, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ 
A43980-2004Dec7.html).  
 193. Shane, supra note 28. 
 194. “President Ronald Reagan famously welcomed to the Oval Office a delegation of bearded 
‘Afghan freedom fighters’ whose social and theological views were hardly distinguishable from those 
later embraced by the Taliban[,]” which the U.S. declared war against after 9/11. Shane, supra note 28. 
 195. See generally Michael Rubin, Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?, MIDDLE EAST REV. INT’L 
AFF. (Mar. 2002), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/who-is-responsible-
for-the-taliban, which provides a throughout analysis of U.S. support of the Mujahideen, who fended 
off their common foe of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and ultimately mutated into the Taliban.  
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and provided safe-haven to Bin Laden in exchange for soldiers that 
supported its internal war against the North Alliance: 
Bin Ladin brought with him to Afghanistan a well-equipped and 
fiercely loyal division of fightersperhaps numbering only 2,000. 
While many of these trained in al-Qa’ida’s camps for terrorism abroad 
or protected bin Ladin and his associates at their various safe-houses, 
bin Ladin made available several hundred for duty on the Taliban’s 
frontline with Masud, where they assured the Taliban of at a 
minimum continued balance and stalemate. While the Taliban 
suffered a high international cost for hosting bin Ladin, this was offset 
by the domestic benefits the regime gained. The war with the 
Northern Alliancenot recognition by Washington or even the 
Islamic Worldwas the Taliban’s chief priority.196 
The Taliban seized the Afghan capital of Kabul on September 26, 
1996, giving it control over much of the nation and its most important 
city.197 As a result, Afghanistan became a fertile soil where Wahhabi 
Islam was enforced and a land that harbored Bin Laden and Al Qaeda 
fighters from all over the world. The American foreign policy objectives 
of countering Soviet expansion in the Mideast and curbing Iranian 
influence, which drove greater investment in Saudi Arabia, also had a 
direct impact on spawning, and facilitating, the emergence of the very 
terror networks that menace it today by way of terror attacks and 
inspiring radicalization. 
C. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS, SHIFTING AMERICAN SECTARIAN POLICY 
1.   An Investment Gone Wrong: Rise of Wahhabi Terror 
“It is now beyond serious dispute that the ideology that old king Saud 
used to conquer Arabia is now being used by the jihadists to wage 
religious war against the West.”198 
“The struggle over the two banks of the Gulf since the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979” is still a geopolitical reality in the region.199 Iran 
and Saudi Arabia are still jostling and jockeying for regional supremacy 
in the Mideast,200 and the United States stands loyally alongside its 
Saudi allies. However, the 9/11 terror attacks spurred renewed 
suspicion of Saudi Arabia from policymakers, and began to erode 
Washington, D.C.’s allegiance to it: 
 
 196. Id.  
 197. For a descriptive history of the origins of and incidents around the Afghan Civil War, which 
lasted from 1996–2001, see OLIVIER ROY, AFGHANISTAN: FROM HOLY WAR TO CIVIL WAR (1995).  
 198. Garner & McFarland, supra note 112, at 227–28.  
 199. Muhammad ibn Al-Mokhtar Al-Shinqiti (Mohamed Ghilan trans.), Sunnis and Shias: 
Between Engagement & Disconnection, MOHAMED GHILAN BLOG (Aug. 30, 2015), 
https://mohamedghilan.com/2015/08/30/sunnis-and-shias-between-engagement-disconnection/. 
 200. See Thom Poole, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Great Rivalry Explained, BBC NEWS (Jan.  
4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35221569.  
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In the days following 9/11 many eyes turned to Saudi Arabia after it 
was reported that all of the bombers were committed to Wahhabism, 
Saudi Arabia’s particular brand of Islam. Fifteen of the 9/11 jihadists 
were Saudi nationals. Osama bin Laden was born and schooled in the 
desert Kingdom and there acquired not only his wealth but religious 
zealotry as well.201 
In the aftermath of 9/11, Saudi Arabia was no longer merely the 
source of oilbut from the vantage point of the state, and a growing 
segment of the American public, also the source of Muslim terror. The 
transnational terror network that orchestrated the 9/11 terror attacks, 
Al Qaeda, which was helmed by bin Laden and was driven by 
Wahhabism,202 the interpretation of Sunni though that founds its roots 
in Saudi Arabia. “From 1932 to 9/11 the heirs to the Saud/Wahhab pact 
maintained their absolute fidelity to Wahhabist principles.”203 From 
1932 to present day, the Wahhabism enshrined and exported by its 
rulers has made “Saudi Arabia [ ] the engine of Jihad,”204 or the 
“fountainhead of the world’s Islamic terrorism.”205 
The U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia has deep roots. Spanning eight 
decades, the ties that bind Washington, D.C. to Riyadh were evident in 
more than simply economics or politics. The tens of thousands of Saudi 
students that enroll in American universities every year,206 and the Ivy 
League buildings bearing the names of Saudi royalty attest to the depth 
and breadth of that relationship. Siding with Sunnism and Saudi Arabia 
paid enormous dividends to the U.S. and cemented its foothold in the 
Mideast. Over this time span, “U.S. policy in the Middle East [has been] 
inextricably tied to Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic course.”207 However, the 
9/11 terror attacksand specifically, the identity of the culprits and the 
brand of Sunni Islam that drove themseeded doubt and debate about 
the U.S.’s fidelity to Saudi Arabia. 
Legal scholars have argued that Saudi Arabia, which “fosters 
terrorist ideology should be liable to pay for the damages caused when 
that ideology seeps across its borders.”208 Initially a scholarly argument, 
 
 201. Garner & McFarland, supra note 112, at 223–24.  
 202. Garner & McFarland, supra note 112, at 224.  
 203. Garner & McFarland, supra note 112, at 237.  
 204. Rod Nordland et al., Surge of Suicide Bombers, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 2007, at 30–32 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 205. Garner & McFarland, supra note 112, at 237. 
 206. Many Saudi citizens who earn their undergraduate and/or graduate educations in the 
United States or Europe are becoming an “opposing force in Saudi society,” keen on “advocat[ing] 
more modern social and governmental structures,” as an alternative to the conservative and austere 
measures maintained by the ruling Wahhabists. Mirkow, supra note 160, at 161. This element 
generally pushes for a more inclusive and pluralist form of government, “[which encourages] 
diversity among Sunnis and between Sunnis and Shi’ites,” both of which are stifled by the Wahhabis. 
Yamani, supra note 168, at 144.  
 207. Mirkow, supra note 160, at 163.  
 208. Garner & McFarland, supra note 112, at 228. See generally id. (articulating that “Saudi 
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this argument developed into a case filed in civil court, which catapulted 
it into a matter debated by mainstream media,209 presidential 
candidates,210 and the public at large. As a result, rising suspicion of 
Saudi Arabia within government were also mainstreamed in the 
broader polity. 
The state has also linked a series of incidents of mass violence to 
Wahhabi-inspired terrorism. On December 2, 2015, two “ISIS-inspired” 
culprits shot and killed fourteen innocent people at the Inland Regional 
Center in San Bernardino, California.211 On June 12, 2016, Omar 
Mateen, an Afghan American with alleged ties to ISIS, executed  
forty-nine and wounded fifty-three people in the Pulse nightclub in 
Orlando, Florida.212 The “Orlando attack” is considered the “deadliest 
[terror] attack” since 9/11.213 While ties to ISIS, in both instances, were 
tenuous, media and state narratives latched onto the idea that the 
culprits were radicalized by ISIS, despite having no material connection 
to the terror network aside from reading online literature or making 
social media statements. 
However, staunch alignment with Saudi Arabia, and Sunnism, 
started to gradually retrench during with the War in Iraq, which 
witnessed the empowerment of a Shia Muslim government. 
2.   Empowering Shia Rule in Iraq 
For the Bush Administration, the 9/11 terror attacks opened the 
door to pursue regime change in Iraq. After the War in Afghanistan, the 
Bush administration looked to protract its foreign war on terror into 
Iraq, “U.S. policy was driven by a belief that Iraq posed a security threat 
 
Arabia’s dedication to building Wahhabism globally should make Saudi Arabia civilly liable for at 
least some small part of the harm caused by Wahabist-inspired terrorists.”). 
 209. For example, see Editorial Board, Should We Let 9/11 Victims Sue Saudi Arabia? Not so 
Fast., WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/should-we-let-911-
victims-sue-saudi-arabia-not-so-fast/2016/09/15/f0067338-791f-11e6-bd86-b7bbd53d2b5d_story 
.html? (articulating opposition to a precedent that could expose the U.S. government to challenges of 
the same kind from citizens in states the U.S. has engaged in war, proxy war, or aggression of some 
kind).  
 210. See John Hudak, What the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Means for the Middle East, 
BROOKINGS (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-the-2016-u-s-presidential 
-election-means-for-the-middle-east.  
 211. “Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik had gone on an ISIS-inspired rampage, killing 14 and 
injuring 22.” Esmé E. Deprez, Violence Across American Weighs on Voters’ Minds, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 
19, 2016, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-19/in-cities-struck-by 
-mayhem-election-framed-by-still-raw-wounds. For an immediate and local account of the “San 
Bernardino Shootings,” see Paloma Esquivel et al., Obama: ‘This Was an Act of Terrorism Designed 
to Kill Innocent People’, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015, 5:27 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/ 
la-me-ln-san-bernardino-terror-probe-widens-as-obama-set-to-speak-20151206-story.html .  
 212. See Ana Swanson, The Orlando Attack Could Transform the Picture of Post-9/11 Terrorism 
in America, WASH. POST (June 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/ 
2016/06/12/the-orlando-attack-could-transform-the-picture-of-post-911-terrorism-in-america.  
 213. Id.  
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through its alleged stockpile of Weapons of Mass Destruction (“WMD”). 
The U.S. subsequently targeted Iraq in a full-scale military invasion 
under the banner of ‘Freedom’ within the context of the U.S.’s post-9/11 
global ‘War on Terror.’”214 After toppling Saddam Hussein, the U.S. 
installed a transitional legal system that expunged the Ba’ath Party 
structure installed by the longtime dictator.215 In addition, the new Iraqi 
government witnessed the empowerment of the nation’s Shia Muslim 
majority, a group persecuted under Hussein, as the de facto leaders of 
the new government.216 
The Iraq War’s aftermath proved transformative for the region. It 
ushered in two developments that would radically intensify the 
sectarianism currently gripping the Mideast. First, the postwar tumult 
in Iraq created the political vacuum that spawned ISIS, the Wahhabi 
driven terror network that devastates the region and inspires 
radicalization abroad.217 The installation of a Shia Muslim majority 
government in Iraq also facilitated the emergence of ISIS, a 
fundamentalist Sunni group.218 Second, it opened the door to a Shia 
majority government in post-war Iraq, marking the first time an Arab 
nation was effectively controlled by the minority sect.219 
The political ascendency of Shia Muslims in Iraq furnished Iran 
with an allied government within a state it engaged in a bloody eight 
year with. In addition, Shia Iraq furnished Shia Iran with a direct 
geography pathway into the Levant, which greatly facilitated its ability 
to arm and support its proxies alongside the Mediterranean: 
The integration of Iraq into the alliance between Tehran, Damascus 
and Beirut will also influence the balance of power, provide more 
political, financial and military support and greater strategic depth to 
Syria. The alliance is also likely to provide more support for Islamic 
groups such as Hezbollah . . . [in Lebanon].220 
The U.S. sectarian strategy of empowering Iraq’s Shia Muslim 
majority in postwar Iraq understated the new government’s affinity for 
the Shia clerical authority in Iran. “U.S. officials believed that Iraq was 
 
 214. Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of Operation Iraqi 
“Freedom,” 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2295, 2296 (2007).  
 215. For discussion of Iraq’s Transitional Administrative Law (“TAL”) in the context of its 
immediate implementation, see Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, The International Migration of 
Constitutional Norms in the New World Order: Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: 
An Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (2006). 
 216. Id. at 907.  
 217. FAWAZ A. GERGES, ISIS: A HISTORY: ISIS 50 (2016). 
 218. This Article will analyze the emergence of ISIS in Part III.C.1.  
 219. “The war in Iraq has produced a tremendous change in the Middle East and in the Muslim 
world at large. For the first time in history, an Arab country is controlled by the Shia.” Ely Karmon, 
Iran’s Role in the Radicalization of the Sunni-Shia Divide, in SHIA POWER: NEXT TARGET IRAN?  
273, 273 (Michel Korinman & John Laughland, eds., 2007).  
 220. Id. at 285.  
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far more secular than the Iranian theocracy, and that in any case the 
traditionally quietist Iraqi clergy would choose to remain outside the 
political sphere.”221 This presumption, however, proved false. Shia 
clerics played a pivotal role in the postwar restructuring process222 and 
subsequently leveraged their influential role to formalize stronger ties 
with their Shia Muslim counterparts in Iran. 
Consequently, the U.S.’s remaking of the Iraqi government 
spawned an unprecedented geopolitical shift: two Shia-controlled 
governments, side-by-side, in the Mideast. Turnover of Iraq from a 
Sunni-controlled secular state to a Shia-governed state stretched the 
breadth of the Shia Iran’s arc to unprecedented lengths, and the 
magnitude of Iranian power to unreached heights. This shift intensified 
fear of Iranian power in Washington, D.C., and particularly, the menace 
it posed to its allies in the region. Mounting fear of expanding Iranian 
regional hegemony made the next domino possible—disarmament of 
Iranian nuclear capabilities followed by rapprochement between 
Tehran and Washington, D.C. 
3.   Rapprochement with Shia Iran 
Thirty-seven years after the Iranian Revolution ejected a principal 
U.S. ally and implemented a primary enemy in his place, normalized 
relations with Iran again seems possible. On January 16, 2016, 
President Obama brokered a “historic compromise” with Iran that put 
an end to the latter’s nuclear weapons program.223 In turn, this 
compromise with the longtime rival opened the door for “the U.S. and 
international community [to] begin the next phase . . . [of] lifting its 
nuclear-related sanctions on Iran.”224 
The deal between Washington, DC and Tehran also signals the 
possibility of “wider rapprochement” between the longtime rivals.225 
Relations would enhance the economic interests of both states, but 
more urgently, enable a coalitional effort against a common enemy in 
the region: ISIS specifically and Wahhabi-inspired terror networks 
generally. 
 
 221. Feldman & Martinez, supra note 215, at 893.  
 222. Feldman & Martinez, supra note 215, at 893–97.  
 223. “The State Department . . . agreed to pay the Iranian government $1.7 billionsettling a 
case that had been tied up at the Hague Tribunal since 1981 after $400 million in Iranian assets were 
frozen along with diplomatic relations in 1979. The two countries agreed on a $1.3 billion 
compromise on interest.” Eric Bradner, The Week that Changed U.S.-Iran Relations, Explained, 
CNN (Jan. 18, 2016, 8:39 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/18/politics/iran-obama-what-
happened/index.html. 
 224. The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/node/328996 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 225. David Crist, Burying the Hatchet with Iran, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 25, 2015, 9:15 AM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/25/burying-the-hatchet-with-iran-nuclear-negotiations/.  
F - BEYDOUN_29 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2018  10:20 AM 
466 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:429 
With the Iraq War as a cautionary tale, and the fears of putting 
boots on the ground in Syria or again in Iraq, experts contend that 
“[t]he United States needs Shia Iran to fight the extremist Sunnis of the 
Islamic State . . . .”226 Siding with Iran against ISIS presents the DOS 
with the lone regional power willing to battle the terror network on the 
ground in Syria and Iraq, since U.S. government officials suspect that 
Turkey and Saudi Arabiathe Sunni powers in the regionsponsor 
ISIS, and other Wahhabi-inspired terror groups.227 
Furthermore, beyond the short-term interest of dismantling ISIS, 
rapprochement with Iran may have more long-term benefits. First, a 
common ideological thread, Wahhabism, binds the most menacing 
terror networks in the Mideast. Iran stands in direct opposition to 
Wahhabism, which inspires ISIS and other kindred terror networks, 
which stand as “the single greatest threat to the United States 
emanating from the Middle East.”228 Choosing Iran, over Saudi Arabia, 
will enlist a longtime ally against Al Qaeda, ISIS and their ideological 
progeny, which aligns with DOS’s interest in the region, and as analyzed 
in Part III, the DHS counterterror objective of countering homegrown 
radicalization. 
Second, anti-Americanism is on the decline in Iran: “an  
American-Iranian détente has all the force of culture behind it.  
Anti-Americanism has been in retreat in Iran for decades. Shia Iran is 
partially democratic and far more sophisticated, enlightened, and 
Westernized than benighted, culturally sterile Wahhabi Saudi 
Arabia.”229 
Bisecting Islam, as a foreign policy strategy, experienced a  
three-phase transition: first, from siding staunchly with Sunni Saudi 
Arabia; second, isolating Shia Iran as primary geopolitical threat; and 
third, and during the protracted war on terror that marks Wahhabi 
inspired terrorism as principal nemesis, the beginnings of a pivot 
toward détente with Shia Iran. 
Indeed, “[t]he United States’ lifting of sanctions in Iran offers 
optimism for retrenching the rife and politicized sectarianism” gripping 
 
 226. Robert D. Kaplan, Warming to Iran, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/warming-to-iran/383512/. 
 227. For critical statements from Vice President Joe Biden against Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and 
their support of ISIS, Al Qaeda and other terror networks, see Adam Taylor, Behind Biden’s Gaffe Lie 
Real Concerns About Allies’ Role in Rise of the Islamic State, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/10/06/behind-bidens-gaffe-some-
legitimate-concerns-about-americas-middle-east-allies. 
 228. Fareed Zakaria, Opinion, The United States Shouldn’t Take Sides in the Sunni-Shiite 
Struggle, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-united-states 
-shouldnt-take-sides-in-the-sunni-shiite-struggle/2016/01/07/a992713c-b56f-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d 
124_story.html. 
 229. Kaplan, supra note 226.  
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the Mideast.230 More accurately, the DOS’s sectarian shift in the 
Mideast away from Sunni Saudi Arabia and toward Shia Iran, in fact, 
aligns with the strategic logic of DHS’s domestic counterterror 
strategypartnering with Shia Muslims in the U.S. to combat Wahhabi 
inspired, homegrown radicals. In the global war on terror, where threat 
is said to be fluid and transnational, foreign policy and domestic policy 
may be one in the same. 
The future of American relations with Iran during the Trump 
Administration is unclear. President Trump has made public statements 
about undoing the deal the Obama Administration struck with Iran,231 
but at the time of this Article, has yet to do so. Regardless of how the 
Trump Administration proceeds, it seems likely that the general 
trajectory of engagement with Iran is moving more in the direction of 
rapprochement, particularly as the threat of ISIS and offshoot terror 
networks loom, faring well for a sectarian CVE strategy stateside. A 
trend that will cool relations with Shia Muslims in the U.S., and in turn, 
heighten the prospect of enlisting them as domestic allies in the 
campaign against homegrown radicalization. 
III.  SECTARIANISM AS DOMESTIC COUNTERTERROR STRATEGY 
“If two parties of the faithful fight each other, then conciliate them. 
Yet if one is rebellious to the other, then fight the insolent one until it 
returns to God’s command.” 
- The Holy Qur’an232 
“Fighting over the past is a type of crowding over  
the doors to the future.” 
- Muhammad ibn Al-Mokhtar Al-Shinqiti233 
DHS has prioritized countering homegrown radicalization as its 
primary counterterror objective. Homegrown radicalization is the 
process by which Muslims in the U.S. are ideologically inspired by a 
transnational terror network, such as Al Qaeda or ISIS, and mobilized 
to commit a terror act. As discussed in Part II.C, the rise of Wahhabi 
extremismembodied by the two transnational terror organizations 
identified abovehas been framed by “radicalization theorists” as a 
brand of “Sunni extremism.” DHS and subsidiary counterterror arms 
have adopted this baseline, and therefore, profiled homegrown 
radicalization as a Sunni phenomenon. 
 
 230. Beydoun & Zahawi, supra note 19, at 60.  
 231. See Fred Kaplan, Brace Yourselves for Iran Deal Repeal, SLATE (July 27, 2017, 3:28 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2017/07/trump_may_soon_try_to
_kill_the_iran_deal.html. 
 232. Saud, supra note 4, at 87 (citing 49:9 of the Qur’an).  
 233. Al-Shinqiti, supra note 199. 
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The state presumption that radicalization is a distinctly Sunni 
Muslim threat opens the door for collaboration with Shia Muslims as 
partners in counter-radicalization policing. Facilitated by the 
theological differences examined in Part I and the modern political 
rivalry analyzed in Part II, DHS is certain to employ both in outreach 
efforts to resonate with and recruit Shia Muslim as tactical partners and 
counterterror informants. Bisecting Muslims in America, therefore, will 
be an integral part of counter-radicalization strategy. Although DHS 
counter-radicalizations programs and policies are facially neutral with 
regard to framing radicalization as a Sunni phenomenon, let alone 
Muslim,234 DHS outreach efforts and community policing take on a 
distinctly Muslim and sometimes sectarian form.235 
This Part scrutinizes the emerging sectarian strategy deployed by 
DHS and its local interlocutors to advance the goals of counter-
radicalization policing. Subpart A investigates the state’s acceptance of 
homegrown radicalization as a predominantly Sunni phenomenon, 
while Subpart B reveals the strategic opportunities that framing creates 
within Shia Muslim communities. By capitalizing on existing sectarian 
division within the Muslim American population, this per se bisection 
of American Islam abets the intensification of sectarian hostilities 
amongst Shia and Sunni Muslims. 
A. RADICALIZATION AS A “SUNNI PHENOMENON” 
1.   Radicalization Theory 
Counter-radicalization is “built upon the presumption that Muslim 
identity is associated with a national security threat, and 
while . . . framed in a facially neutral fashion,”236 is “cloaked in expertise 
about the process by which Muslims become terrorists.”237 
Radicalization itself is “a social-psychological process through which 
non-radical Muslims come to a religious worldview that is tolerant, 
perhaps even supportive, of terrorist violence.”238 Therefore, the process 
of radicalization is, generally, directly proportional with a Muslim’s 
degree of religiosity or political dissidence239 and conspicuous 
 
 234. The word “Muslim,” let alone “Sunni,” is not mentioned once in EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2016), the updated report outlining the Obama Administration’s 
reformed strategy and framework for counter-radicalization moving forward.  
 235. Akbar, supra note 29, at 811. Although not explicitly associated with Islam, the term has 
been linked to Muslims, and counter-radicalization efforts are primarily focused on Muslim 
communities. Akbar, supra note 29, at 811. 
 236. Beydoun, supra note 25, at 114 (including counter-radicalization policing as a form of 
structural Islamophobia).  
 237. Akbar, supra note 29, at 817.  
 238. Rascoff, supra note 30, at 140.  
 239. “Marking religious and political activities as the indicators of radicalization, the discourse 
BEYDOUN-69.2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2018  10:20 AM 
February 2018]                 BISECTING AMERICAN ISLAM? 469 
expression of religious observance may signal the prospect of a subject 
becoming radicalized.240 Further, “[r]adicalization [theory] suggests 
that the path from Muslim to terrorist is a predictable one . . . .”241 
Therefore, the predictive pathway toward radicalization makes it 
preventable. Prevention is at the core of radicalization theory, which 
centers exclusively on “Muslim subjects and geographies as 
presumptive sources of terrorism.”242 Foundational radicalization 
theory links the propensity for radicalization with “certain religious and 
political cultures within Muslim communities.”243 It constructs “an 
identifiable and predictable process by which a Muslim becomes a 
terrorist,”244 broken down into four stages: “‘(1) preradicalization,’  
‘(2) identification,’ ‘(3) indoctrination’ and ‘(4) action.’”245 
Thus, radicalization theory echoes the baseline that “terrorists are 
always Muslim”246 because it is almost entirely focused on Islam, and 
the religion’s capacity to inspire extremism or endorse the belief that 
“terrorist violence [is] religiously sanctioned.”247 Furthermore, 
counterterror policing models based on this theory adopted that 
baseline, and have shaped counter-radicalization policing strategies 
that prioritize Muslim extremism as the primary, if not the exclusive, 
concern. In short, radicalization focuses almost exclusively on Islamic 
threat,248 and in line with contemporary transnational threats, Al Qaeda 
and ISIS, principally framed as a Sunni Muslim phenomenon. 
CVE is the formal counter-radicalization program adopted by the 
DHS in 2011.249 Adopting the baselines and structure of counter-
radicalization theory, the Obama Administration installed CVE as the 
cornerstone of its domestic war on terror efforts. CVE, structurally, 
connects federal policing agents with local law enforcement, with the 
principal objective of identifying prospective radicals in local 
 
links religious and political practices in Muslim communities with the likelihood of 
terrorisminviting state scrutiny into the halls of Muslim communities, and changing the terms of 
engagement with the state for Muslims.” Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows,  
62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 879 (2015).  
 240. Khaled A. Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 241. Akbar, supra note 29, at 811.  
 242. Beydoun, supra note 25, at 118.  
 243. Akbar, supra note 29, at 814.  
 244. Akbar, supra note 29, at 820. 
 245. Akbar, supra note 29, at 820. 
 246. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never White: A 
Critical Race Approach to Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 455 (2017) (examining the embedded 
imagining and counterterror pursuit of terrorism as phenomenon exclusive to Muslims, and not 
associated with whites).  
 247. Rascoff, supra note 30, at 141.  
 248. “At the heart of radicalization discourse is the idea that Muslims and Islam are responsible 
for terrorism. Radicalization discourse creates false and stigmatizing equivalences: between Islam, 
Muslims, and terrorism, and between Islam, Muslims, and violence.” Akbar, supra note 239, at 895.  
 249. DHS COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 31. 
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communities, and ideally, arresting them and preventing them from 
partaking in terrorist acts. The program is almost exclusively focused on 
Muslim subjects and geographies. 
Community engagement is central to CVE. Law enforcement relies 
heavily on informants within the community to gather information on a 
radicalization subject,250 and when he or she is graduating toward 
action, “turning” that individual. DHS and local enforcement seek to 
partner with civil organizations, religious centers and leaders, private 
businesses, high-profile community members, students, and more. 
“Therefore, individuals immersed and respected in the community are 
the best conduit for communicating with local law enforcement.”251 
By building these community relationships and inroads within 
spaces where Muslims worship, congregate and frequent, CVE relies 
upon its community interlocutors and informants to monitor and 
gather information about subjects of interest, and in many instances, 
identify and tip law enforcement about new subjects purported to be 
prone to radicalization. CVE Policing followed in the footsteps of the 
theory, and focused almost entirely on Muslims. 
2.   Instituting CVE Policing 
In August of 2011, in the midst of his first term in the White House, 
President Obama established what would become the “signature 
counterterrorism policy” of his administration.252 Ten years after the 
9/11 terror attacks, and creation of DHS253 and enactment of the US 
PATRIOT ACT,254 Obama implemented a collaborative, community 
approach to keep tabs on Muslims in the U.S. Counter-radicalization 
policing, dubbed “Countering Violent Extremism” by DHS,255 would 
become the new counterterror paradigm and program. 
In its formal rolling out of CVE, DHS explicitly identified Wahhabi 
inspired terror networks, with a focus on Al-Qaeda, as the 
 
 250.  
[T]he local police are in significant respects well positioned to tap into their relationships 
with the local community to useful effect. These relationships are a natural fit for local 
departments that have been practicing a form of community policing for over a 
generation. Not only do these long-term, multifaceted relationships have the effect of 
potentially restraining the impulses towards overly aggressive counterterrorism 
measures, they form the backbone of a robust intelligence network. 
Rascoff, supra note 29, at 1734.  
 251. Khaled A. Beydoun, Beyond the Paris Attacks: Unveiling the War Within French 
Counterterror Policy, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1321 (2016). 
 252. Rascoff, supra note 30, at 127.  
 253. DHS was created pursuant to section 111 of The Homeland Security Act of 2002. 6 U.S.C. 
§ 111 (2003).  
 254. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 274 (2001).  
 255. See generally 2011 DHS COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 31. 
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“challenge.”256 The memo articulated the threat “inspired or directed by 
al-Qai’ida and its affiliates and adherents,” in addition to neo-Nazis, 
hate groups, racial supremacists, and “international and domestic 
terrorist groups” generally.257 However, in light of the resources 
dedicated to track and assassinate Osama Bin Laden, the threat posed 
by Al-Qaeda and its sympathizers, and the fear of “lur[ing] Americans 
to terrorism in order to create support networks and facilitate attack 
planning” from inside the U.S.,258 the specific brand of violent 
extremism DHS sought to counter was of the Muslim variety. 
DHS’s framing of Wahhabi-inspired terror networks as the 
principal counterterror challenge, by extension, made Muslims in the 
U.S. vulnerable to state suspicion and surveillance. Following the 
community policing model, DHS structured its “community-based 
approach” to rely heavily on “families, local communities, and local 
institutions” as CVE partners and informants.259 
Therefore, the community-based model ushered in by CVE profiled 
Muslims in the U.S. as both the ideal counterterror informant and the 
archetypal radicalization suspect. This paradox was vividly evident in 
the words of President Obama, who stated, “[a]s extremists try to 
inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are responding with the 
strength of our communities, with the respect for the rule of law, and 
with the conviction that Muslim Americans are part of our American 
family.”260 While CVE strategy and policing poses immediate challenges 
for Muslim Americans, President Obama’s rhetoric of reassurance 
facilitated the aim of establishing partnerships with them. “Engaging” 
Muslim American partners, both at the institutional and individual 
level,261 is vital for deputizing individuals that hold trusted relationships 
with prospective radicals. The first and front line of monitoring 
 
 256. 2011 DHS COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 31, at 1–2.  
 257. 2011 DHS COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 31, at 1.  
 258. 2011 DHS COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 31, at 2.  
 259. 2011 DHS COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 31, at 2. “Their awareness of the 
threat and willingness to work with one another and government is part of our long history of 
community-based initiatives and partnerships dealing with a range of public safety challenges.” 2011 
DHS COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 31, at 2–3.  
 260. 2011 DHS COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 31, at 3 (quoting Barack H. 
Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011)).  
 261.  
Engagement is essential for supporting community-based efforts to prevent violent 
extremism because it allows government and communities to share information, 
concerns, and potential solutions. Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss 
violent extremism are to (1) share sound, meaningful, and timely information about the 
threat of radicalization to violence with a wide range of community groups and 
organizations, particularly those involved in public safety issues; (2) respond to 
community concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better understand 
how we can effectively support community-based solutions. 
2011 DHS COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 31, at 5.  
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prospective radicals would be those closest to the suspected radicals, in 
turn, converting the most private spacesone’s living quarters, place of 
worship, business and cultural affiliations, telephone and computer 
activitysusceptible to investigation by friends, family, and community 
stakeholders. 
Local law enforcement is the second line of CVE surveillance. 
“Government and law enforcement at the local level have  
well-established relationships with communities, developed through 
years of consistent engagement, and therefore can effectively build 
partnerships and take action on the ground.”262 “Action on the ground” 
encompasses facilitating relationships with mosques, community 
leaders, and other stakeholders, conducting “knock and talk” 
interviews,263 and arrests. Community engagement is pivotal to CVE 
strategy and success,264 and the Obama Administration effectively 
navigated inroads into Muslim American communities by way of 
progressive rhetoric toward Muslims, an administration that hired 
Muslims,265 and a presidency that symbolically touted tolerance for 
Islamdespite protracting war on terror policy. Certainly, the election 
of Donald Trump, and the Islamophobia he capitalized on to win the 
presidency, was a marked shift that seems poised to materially alter 
CVE policing, and erode community engagement with it. 
President Trump has proposed a reform of CVE strategy and 
policing. Echoing the Obama Administration, he prioritizes “expos[ing] 
the networks in our society that support radicalization.”266 Therefore, 
President Trump subscribes to the core of radicalization theory; but 
unlike the Obama Administration, he has discussed shifting 
radicalization theory and meshing it with his “clash of civilizations” 
worldview,267 which spawns counterterror policy that heightens the 
 
 262. 2011 DHS COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 31, at 6.  
 263. See generally Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law EnforcementThe First Amendment and  
Counterterrorism Interviews, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 41 (2011) (analyzing the process and free speech 
encroachments posed by national security, knock and talk interviews).  
 264. “DOJ engages in extensive community engagement efforts through many of its offices and 
divisions. DOJ’s community engagement efforts have included its Community Relations Service 
(“CRS”), Civil Rights Division, U.S. Attorneys’ offices, and Office of Justice Programs. The FBI 
undertakes its own efforts through its Community Outreach Program.” Akbar, supra note 239, at 859.  
 265. “Examples include the recently developed position of Special Representative to Muslim 
Communities within the State Department” (Rascoff, supra note 30, at 156), and the White House 
Muslim Community Liaison, created and staffed by the Obama Administration in May 2016. See 
Antonia Blumberg, Meet the White House’s New Muslim American Community Liaison, HUFF. POST 
(May 26, 2016, 5:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/white-house-muslim-community-
liaison-zaki-barzinji_us_57462d15e4b03ede4413d236. 
 266. See Editorial Board, Mr. Trump’s Foreign Policy Confusions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/opinion/mr-trumps-foreign-policy-confusions.html 
(internal quotations omitted).  
 267. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF.  
22, 22–23 (1993) (espousing the theory that the primary source of state conflict will stem from 
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presumption that Muslim identity, in all forms, is correlative with 
terrorism. Trump’s counter-radicalization program is, “likely to be 
renamed Countering Radical Islam or Countering Violent Jihad.”268 
However, at time of this Article, the Trump Administration had not 
formally implemented significant reforms to Obama’s CVE program. 
3.   Framing Radicalization as a Sunni Phenomenon 
Radicalization is framed as a Sunni phenomenon. This framing 
forms the crux of the CVE Policing model formally adopted by the 
Obama Administration in 2011, and despite overtures made by 
President Trump to restructure the program, continues at the time of 
this Article. The counter-radicalization theory forming the foundation 
of CVE Policing can be simplified accordingly: 
1. If transnational terror networks (Al Qaeda, ISIS) subscribe to 
Wahhabism; and, 
2. Wahhabism is a branch of, and theologically linked to, Sunni 
Islam; and, 
3. Because (at least) fifty-five percent of Muslim Americans 
observe some brand of Sunni Islam;269 then, 
4. That Muslim American demographic is susceptible to 
becoming radicalized and terror recruitment; which, 
5. Compels DHS to marshal its resources to prevent and counter 
the radicalization of these elements. 
Therefore, while counter-radicalization theory driving CVE 
policing in the U.S. hones in on Islam at large, contemporary 
manifestations of terror threats, as designated by the Executive, have 
tailored policing strategies that focus almost entirely on Sunni Muslim 
populations. This makes these communities, and individuals within and 
adjacent to them, the primary subjects of surveillance concern. It makes 
other Muslim populations, including the Shi’a communities, 
prospective allies and interlocutors. Before examining how Shiite 
communities figure into CVE recruitment strategy, grappling with 
counterterror conflation of Sunni Muslims and Wahhabism, a fringe 
segment of the broader sect, must be examined first. 
The DHS presumption that radicalization is a Sunni phenomenon 
creates far-reaching First Amendment concerns. As examined by a 
range of scholars and my previous work, the over-inclusive profile of 
homegrown radicalization as a Sunni phenomenoninstead of a 
 
cultural differences between societies). But see Beydoun, supra note 45, at 144–45 (critiquing 
Samuel Huntington’s theory, which assumes that Islam is monolithic, by highlighting sectarian 
division and in-fighting among Muslim groups, indicative of heterogeneity and division).  
 268. Michael Crowley, Trump’s Terror-Fighting Team Yet to Take Shape, POLITICO (Dec.  
20, 2016, 7:17 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/donald-trump-terrorism-232870.  
 269. Lipka, supra note 77.  
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specifically Wahhabi (or Salafi) phenomenonchills and violates a 
range of First Amendment concerns, most notably, the Free Exercise of 
Religion and Speech. 
Research illustrates that Wahhabism and conservative Salafi 
traditions are not often practiced by Sunni Muslims in the U.S. While 
the majority of Muslim Americans subscribe to Sunni Islam, only one to 
three percent worship at a Salafi mosque.270 Further, while state and 
media illustration of Salafi Islam is often distorted and caricatured as 
anti-American, research provides a different portrait. A survey of Salafi 
mosques in America uncovers how the tradition may spawn political 
rigidity and at extreme, subversion. “[O]ver 57% of [Salafi mosque 
leaders] agree that America is immoral as opposed to 23% of all the 
other leaders.”271 
Moreover, ten years after 9/11, twenty-five percent of mosque 
leadersmany of them also Salafiresponded that “American society 
is hostile to Islam,”272 a belief central to the apocalyptic worldview 
fueling ISIS, and pervasive in the propaganda it uses to enlist 
disaffected Sunni Muslims in war-torn Muslim-majority states, Europe, 
and the U.S. This evidence counters the inflated number frequently 
volleyed by conservative sources, like the Clarion Project, who conflate 
Sunni mosques with Wahhabi mosques and distort the statistics 
collected by surveys of American mosques.273 
To argue that Sunni Islam, as a broad and diverse sect, spawns 
radicalization is over-simplistic. However, Wahhabismthe brand of 
Salafi Islam enshrined by Saudi Arabiapromotes a rigid and austere 
interpretation of Islamic scripture that facilitates extremist views, and 
as illustrated by the gruesome designs of ISIS in the Arab World and 




. . . Saudi Arabia’s export of the rigid, bigoted, patriarchal, 
fundamentalist strain of Islam known as Wahhabism has fueled 
global extremism and contributed to terrorism. As the Islamic State 
projects its menacing calls for violence into the West, directing or 
 
 270. BAGBY, supra note 134, at 19.  
 271. Id. at 24.  
 272. Id. at 4.  
 273. “A large majority of mosques in the United States are led by Wahhabi clerics. Wahhabism is 
an extreme brand of Islam practiced dominantly in Saudi Arabia. According to Muslim estimates, up 
to 80 percent of mosques in the U.S. are owned, operated and led by Wahhabis.” KeyLargo, U.S. 
Mosques (Wahhabis), CLARION PROJECT (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/ 
bloggers/3011315/posts.  
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inspiring terrorist attacks in country after country, an old debate over 
Saudi influence on Islam has taken on new relevance.274 
As discussed in Part II, the global distribution of Saudi Wahhabism 
has been greatly facilitated by its close alliance with the U.S. Osama bin 
Laden and Al-Qaeda subscribe to Wahhabism, as does ISIS, which, 
“adopted official Saudi textbooks for its schools until the extremist 
group could publish its own books in 2015.”275 Saudi Arabia has 
financed, or helped finance 16 mosques in the U.S.,276 the majority of 
which preach and proselytize the literal brand of Sunni Islam espoused 
by Al-Qaeda and ISIS.277 Yet these mosques are scarce and attended by 
a small minority of Sunni Muslims. 
To stereotype all Sunni Muslims as Wahhabi, or alternatively, 
believe that non-Wahabbi Sunni Muslims are inclined to attend or 
adopt views unique to this tradition, demonstrates shallow knowledge 
of the demographic diversity and jurisprudential heterogeneity within 
Sunni Islam, or fear. 
4.   Policing Sunni Communities 
DHS and its partners are steered by the presumption that 
homegrown radicalization is a predominantly Sunni phenomenon. 
However, this presumption has not fully extinguished the possibility 
that Shia Muslims may also be susceptible to radicalization. This 
possibility became more likely under the Trump Administration, which 
cooled relations with Iran and threatens to undermine the Iran deal 
struck by the Obama Administration.278 Yet, considering that Shia 
Muslims are considered apostates by the transnational networks that 
inspire radicalization, the state’s accompanying presumption is that 
Shia Muslim radicalization is remote.279 Therefore, the sectarian profile 
that shapes counter-radicalization policing, and guides the specific 
demographics to be prioritized, isolates Sunni Muslims as prospective 
radical threats. 
 
 274. Shane, supra note 28. In addition to the 9/11 terror attacks in the U.S., Europe has been 
victimized by a string of Wahhabi-inspired attacks since the 1990s, most notably the Paris Attacks of 
November 13, 2015. See Beydoun, supra, note 251, at 1290–96.   
 275. Shane, supra note 28. “Out of 12 works by Muslim scholars republished by the Islamic State, 
seven are by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the 18th century founder of the Saudi school of Islam, 
said Jacob Olidort, a scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.” Shane, supra note 28. 
 276. Shane, supra note 28. 
 277. For an analysis of how Wahhabi and Salafi thought drive modern terror transnational 
networks, most notably Al Qaeda, see SAGEMAN, supra note 115, at 72.  
 278. See Andrew Exum, If Trump Undermines the Iran Deal, ATLANTIC (July 22, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/trump-iran-nuclear/534597/.  
 279. The prevailing belief is that Shia Muslims tend to be steeped in their beliefs, and less likely 
to convert. Particularly amid today’s sociopolitical climate, which has reawakened the historical and 
theological divides outlined in Part I.  
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This profile dictated which states would become DHS’s counter-
radicalization policing pilot programs.280 In 2014, DHS announced that 
Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis would be the first cities assigned 
with hardline Countering Violent Extremism policing programs.281 
Boston was prioritized because of the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings, 
committed by the Tsarnaev brothers.282 DHS chose Los Angeles as a 
pilot CVE city because of its proximity to the Mexican border, and 
California housing a larger population of Muslims than any another 
state. Finally, Minneapolis is home to a concentrated and large Somali 
population, which is largely a recent-immigrant community with strong 
ties to their homeland.283 
While distinct factors motivated DHS to prioritize these pilot cities, 
the three were bound by: first, were overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim; and 
second, presumptively connected and vulnerable to transnational terror 
networks. My previous work examines CVE Policing’s priority with 
Sunni Muslim communities, and most specifically, communities 




 280. A precedent to federal counter-radicalization policing is the NYPD “Spying on Muslims” 
Program, employed as early as 2002 by way of, “seeding informants in Muslim communities, most 
notably mosques and community centers, in the tri-state area.” Beydoun, supra note 25, at 119.  
 281. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): A Resource Page, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 
12, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/cve-programs-resource-page. 
 282. Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnaev, who are of Chechen origin and Sunni Muslims, carried out 
the “Boston bombings” on April 15, 2013, killing three people and injuring 264. See Nina Burleigh, 
The Brothers Who Became the Boston Marathon Bombers, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 6, 2015, 12:02 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/brothers-who-became-boston-marathon-bombers-319822. Tamerlan 
was killed in the aftermath of the attack, while Dzhokar was imprisoned and sentenced to death. Id. 
For a critique of the “casual racism launched at Chechens” after the Boston Bombings, see Sarah 
Kendzior, The Wrong Kind of Caucasian, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (Apr. 21, 2013), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/2013421145859380504.html.  
 283. Beydoun, supra note 35, at 1477.  
 284. See generally Beydoun, supra note 35. 
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B. SECTARIAN TENSION AS STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY 
“Every day is Ashura, and every land is Karbala.” 
- Prominent Shia Muslim chant285 
1.   Enemy of the State and Shia Muslims 
Modern Shia Muslim political identity is, in great part, shaped by 
its turbulent engagement with Sunni Muslim entities and institutions. 
More specifically, the experience and grand narrative of marginalization 
in a global Muslim community where they are the minority, and within 
the vast majority of Muslim-majority states where their populations are 
second in size to Sunni Muslims, is the crux of Shia Muslim political 
identity. Indeed, their origin story, discussed in Part I, aligns perfectly 
with this modern experience and narrative, as “Shias have often 
invoked the Husayn story to define their conflicts in modern times[,]” 
and “identify their both their domestic and contemporary rivals.”286 
These contemporary rivals are nations-states that subordinate Shia 
Muslims. For instance, countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, but as 
discussed in Part II, also include transnational terror networks that 
victimize Shias, like ISIS. Shia Muslims are heavily persecuted in Saudi 
Arabia, and this circumstance may move Shia Muslims in the U.S. to 
function as informants against extremists “radicalized by Wahhabism.” 
Indeed, the very tradition that drove Saudi Arabia to execute scores of 
Shia dissidents, including “top Shia cleric,” Nimr al-Nimr on January 2, 
2016;287 the tradition that restricts “Shia Muslims to lobby for 
legislation based on their religious beliefs,”288 and most notably, ISIS 
and its near war on Shia Muslim populations in the Levant and Gulf 
regions of the Mideast.289 Shia Muslim opposition to Sunni aggression, 
in the form of national governments and terror networks, has primed 
them to support policies against these entities regarding domestic 
policy within these nation states (in states where they have adequate or 
 
 285. A common chant recited among Shia Muslims, particularly during Ashura processions and 
after Shia communities, or sites, are the targets of Sunni or state aggression. See Every Day Is 
Ashura, and Every Land Is Karbala, ALMANAR (May 12, 2011, 6:17 PM), 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=37126. The chant is also common among Shia 
American youth, who in concentrated Shia communities like the metropolitan Detroit area, can be 
found wearing T-shirts showcasing the slogan. Hishaam D. Aidi, Let Us Be Moors: Race, Islam, and 
“Connected Histories,” in BLACK ROUTES TO ISLAM 133 (Manning Marable ed., 2009).  
 286. NASR, supra note 7, at 43.  
 287. Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr: Saudi Arabia Executes Top Shia Cleric, BBC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35213244. Nimr “was a prominent, outspoken cleric 
who articulated the feelings of those in the country’s Shia minority who feel marginalised and 
discriminated against. This was a figure active on the sensitive Sunni-Shia sectarian fault line that 
creates tension in the Kingdom and far beyond.” Id.  
 288. AN-NA’IM, supra note 84, at 31.  
 289. GERGES, supra note 217.  
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even nominal representation within government), and within regard to 
CVE Policing in the U.S., a group of coveted CVE Policing allies and 
interlocutors. 
Political tension, combined with the framing of radicalization as a 
Sunni phenomenon, creates opportunity for DHS to build strategic 
alliances with Shia Muslims to carry forward CVE Policing. For 
example, DHS adopted counter-radicalization theory. If deconstructed 
more closely, counter-radicalization theory reveals a connected 
theoretical basis for enlisting Shia Muslim partners and informants: 
1. Since Wahhabism is a branch of and is theologically linked to, 
Sunni Islam; and, 
2. A deeply rooted theological rift divides Shia from Sunni 
Muslims; which, 
3. Motivates transnational terror networks that subscribe to 
Wahhabism (Al Qaeda, ISIS) to designate Shia Muslim as 
apostates and propagate their persecution; then, 
4. Shia Muslims, who comprise approximately sixteen percent of 
the Muslim American population,290 are highly unlikely to 
become radicalized; and, 
5. Likely to collaborate with DHS against a kindred enemy that 
persecutes Shia Muslims abroad. 
Capitalizing on divisions with the broader Muslim population, as 
examined in Part II, has been central to U.S. foreign policy. Regarding 
CVE, capitalizing on these divisions has been an emerging strategy 
within Muslim communities. 
Shia Muslims do not have to be in the same spaces as Sunnis to 
monitor them. Shia and Sunnis in the U.S., as outlined in Part I.C.2, are 
more than likely to worship in their own mosques. However, this does 
not preclude the possibility of Shias frequenting Sunni mosques in the 
interest of monitoring a CVE designated subject. Furthermore, the 
seeding of CVE informants is hardly tethered to mosques. Shias may be 
deployed to a range of physical spaces, including community centers, 
political organizations, student organizations, businesses, homes, and 
entirely secular spaces to monitor a CVE subject of interest. However, 
CVE programming is also becoming more focused on the Internet and 
virtual spaces: “[f]or Sunni extremists, social media has revolutionized 
recruitment opportunities. Fundamentalists no longer have to infiltrate 
mainstream mosques to attract recruits surreptitiously, but can now 
disseminate their call to jihad and wait for potential recruits to contact 
them.”291 Therefore, instead of assuming the risks of penetrating 
 
 290. Lipka, supra note 77.  
 291. The Sunni-Shia Divide, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/interactives/ 
sunni-shia-divide?cid=otr-marketing_url-sunni_shia_infoguide#!/sunni-shia-divide?cid=otr-mark 
eting_url-sunni_shia_infoguide (last visited on Jan. 20, 2018).  
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physical and potentially hostile spaces, Shias can simply engage and 
monitor prospective Sunni radicals on Facebook, Twitter, and other 
Internet platforms. 
Indeed, significant Shia cooperation with DHS to carry forward 
CVE programming raises considerable security and legal concerns. 
First, it amplifies the notion among ISIS-inspired individuals and 
prospective radicals that Shia Muslims are in fact “the spying enemy” by 
collaborating with the U.S., the other principal enemy.292 Consequently, 
making Shia Muslims in the U.S. enhanced targets, and therefore, 
exposing them, Shia mosques, and other visible Shia spaces and 
institutions vulnerable to the attack of ISIS-inspired radicals. 
Second, it formally makes the U.S. government, through the work 
of DHS and specifically its Office of Community Outreach, a formal 
participant in the intensification of sectarian tension among Sunni and 
Shia Muslims. Strategic recruitment of Shias to collaborate with CVE 
programming against ISIS-inspired Sunnis in the U.S. propagates the 
“good” versus “bad” Muslim discourse employed by the state after 
9/11.293 But instead of relying on monolithic conceptions of Muslim 
identity, actions bisect Muslims in the U.S. along political, religious, 
and sectarian lines to capitalize on that binary. Before examining this 
budding strategy within the Shia Muslim community, let us examine 
DHS’s strategic engagement with Sufi Muslim elements to facilitate 
CVE programming and initiatives in the U.S. In relation to CVE 
policing, “[t]he phenomenon of engagement is also connected to the 
selection of specific interlocutors within various Muslim 
communitiesa choice which necessarily implicates ‘theological 
criteria[,]’”294 and more specifically, perceives the distinct theologies of 
some groups, including Sufi Muslims, as convergent with domestic 
counterterror strategy and goals. 
2.   Sub-Sectarian CVE Strategy: Enlisting Sufi Support 
Like Shia Muslims, Sufis are a segment of the Muslim population 
that has also experienced aggression from Wahhabi actors, particularly 
ISIS.295 Sufism is a tradition within Islam where search for an inner, 
deeper identity, and developing a “personal relationship with God,”296 is 
the touchstone. Omid Safi, a leader American scholar on Sufism, writes, 
“[t]he mystically oriented among Muslims take the emulation a bit 
 
 292. GERGES, supra note 217, at 82 (quoting al-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIS).  
 293. See Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on 
Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 59 (2004).  
 294. Rascoff, supra note 30, at 154.  
 295. Peter Gottschalk, Who Are the Sufis and Why Does Isis See Them as Threatening?, 
CONVERSATION (Feb. 26, 2017, 4:44 PM), https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-sufis-and-why-
does-isis-see-them-as-threatening-73431. 
 296. Id.  
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more literally: If Muhammad arose to have his own face-to-face 
encounter with the Divine, they too aspire to rise in the footsteps of the 
Prophet, to have their own meeting with God.”297 
Broadly dubbed “mystical Islam,” Sufism is a diverse tradition that 
encompasses a range of orders, which jointly emphasize the importance 
of self-reflection, the honoring of saints, and collective worship. 
Primarily Sunnis, Sufis are targeted by Wahhabi as apostates because of 
their spiritual values and rituals, and perhaps mainly, their veneration 
for saints.298 
Although an approximate figure is unknown, Sufism is commonly 
practiced by Muslims throughout the U.S. It has been dubbed a 
“moderate” version of Islam that offers an alternative to the more 
conservative Sunni traditions,299 particularly Salafism and Wahabbism, 
for DHS and other state agencies. Abetted by Wahabbi aggression 
toward Sufis in the Mideast and beyond, DHS strategized to build ties 
with Sufi leadership in the U.S. to carry forward CVE programming 
shortly after its inception in 2011. In short, capitalizing on sub-sectarian 
tension within Sunni Islam to enlist partners, interlocutors and 
informants in furtherance of CVE strategy. 
DHS and DOS found an ally in Hisham Kabbani, a Lebanese 
American Sufi that helped, “establish the foundation of the 
Naqshbandiyya-Nazimiyya Sufi Order of America.”300 A vocal critic of 
mainstream Sunni Muslim American organizations, most notably the 
Islamic Society of North America and the Council of American-Islamic 
Relations (“CAIR”), Kabbani infamously stated that “extremism has 
been spread to 80 percent of the Muslims in the U.S.” and that “‘there 
are more than 2,000 mosques in the U.S. . . . and 80 percent of them 
are being run by extremist ideologies.’”301 Kabbani’s statement 
endorsed the stereotype that conflates Sunni Islam with its conservative 
and extremist strands, Salafism and Wahhabism, and two years before 
the Obama Administration formally adopted a CVE Policing strategy, 
supported DHS surveillance and monitoring of Sunni Muslim 
 
 297. Omid Safi, Is Islamic Mysticism Really Islam?, HUFF. POST: BLOG (May 20, 2011,  
12:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/omid-safi/is-islamic-mysticism-real_b_841438.html.  
 298. See generally CARL W. ERNST, SUFISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MYSTICAL TRADITION OF 
ISLAM (1997), for an accessible primer on the history, core value system, and demographics of Sufi 
Muslims.  
 299. William Dalrymple, Opinion, Sufis: The Muslims in the Middle, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/opinion/17dalrymple.html.  
 300. About: Shayka Hisham Kabbani, HISHAM KABBANI, http://hishamkabbani.com (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2018). 
 301. Richard H. Curtiss, Dispute Between U.S. Muslim Groups Goes Public, WASH. REP. MIDDLE 
EAST AFF. (June 22, 2009, 3:59 PM), https://www.wrmea.org/1999-april-may/dispute-between-u.s. 
-muslim-groups-goes-public.html.  
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communities, mosques, and civic institutions as spaces where 
radicalization, or the prospect of it, looms.302 
Kabbani, joined by other Sufi leaders, formed the World 
Organization for Resources Development and Education 
(“WORDE”).303 WORDE, according to its mission statement, furnishes, 
“networks with the right resources to build community resilience 
against extremism [which] is a requisite component to any long-term 
development strategy for building communities.”304 Its stated objective 
of “building communities” is proxy language for its principal mission of 
supporting CVE programming,305 and WORDE spearheaded the 
creation of the CVE Program in Montgomery County, Maryland,306 led 
by lawyer and Kabbani acolyte, Hedieh Miarahmadi.307 By developing 
networks and building relationships with Muslims in the metropolitan 
Washington, D.C. area, WORDE was able to identify and enlist 
individuals to serve as eyes and ears on the ground for law enforcement. 
The Montgomery County CVE Program, situated in the heart of a 
metropolitan area with sizable and scattered Muslim communities, 
furnished DHS with a foothold and endorsement from Sufi Muslims to 
carry forward CVE Policing. It sponsored “soft” CVE programming, 
such as workshops, community lectures, and concerts. In his critically 
acclaimed book, Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim 
Youth Culture, political scientist Hisham Aidi writes, “[m]usic featured 
prominently at the Sufi Council’s public events as well, with 
performances by the Naqshbandi Ensemble, who often traveled with 
Shiekh Kabbani.”308 Cultural, educational and music, “a key component 
of the Sufi counteroffensive[,]”309 laid the groundwork for the hardline 
CVE Policing that followed, enabling the recruitment of informants, 
 
 302. Furthermore, Kabbani includes, “records of meetings with President Bush, Vice President 
Cheney, Secretary of State Powell, and Prime Minister Tony Blair’s staff, as well as appearances at 
various Prevent-sponsored events [British counter-radicalization program] in the United Kingdom,” 
as “Recent Accomplishments” on his official website. See Rascoff, supra note 30, at 155.  
 303. Elements of the Sufi Muslim community developed formal relationships with the state after 
9/11 to counter terrorism in the Mideast, laying the groundwork for engagement domestically. This 
was, in part, facilitated by the classification of Sufi Islam as “peaceful Islam,” particularly among 
Orientalist scholars like Bernard Lewis. See Zeyno Baran, Understanding Sufism and Its Potential 
Role in U.S. Policy, NIXON CTR. CONFERENCE REP. (Mar. 2004), http://www.worde.org/ 
publications/commentary/empowering_asj__sufi_muslim_networks/understanding-sufism-and-
its-potential-role-in-u-s-policy/. 
 304. About Us, WORDE, http://www.worde.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).  
 305. “One of the greatest challenges of the 21st century is to overcome radical ideologies that play 
a role in social conflict, political instability, and terrorism.” Id.  
 306. Aaron Miguel Cantú, In Maryland, Faith Leaders and Law Enforcement Fight 
Radicalization, AL JAZEERA ENG. (Sept. 12, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/ 
articles/2015/9/12/in-maryland-a-new-way-of-policing-radical-ideology.html.  
 307. Id.  
 308. HISHAM AIDI, REBEL MUSIC: RACE, EMPIRE, AND THE NEW MUSLIM YOUTH CULTURE 75 (2014).  
 309. Id.  
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identification of key community partners, and build community support 
around the idea of (Sufi) Muslims being involved in the process of 
fighting homegrown radicalization. 
The Montgomery County CVE Program joined the three pilot 
programs launched in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis, but most 
vividly, displayed how DHS seized upon sectarian tensions and rivalry 
to carry forward its CVE Policing vision. The targeting and persecution 
of Sufis, by ISIS and by nation states including Saudi Arabia, its Gulf 
neighbors, and Pakistan, among others, opened the door for DHS to 
build a strategic alliance to combat a common rival. A sectarian 
blueprint it followed with Shia Muslim, evidenced by its attempt to 
build a program similar to the Montgomery County CVE Program in 
Dearborn, Michiganthe capital of Shia Islam in the U.S. 
3.   A Sectarian CVE Strategy: Reaching Out to Shia Muslims 
In Muslim American communities, the Obama Administration 
dangled huge sums of money, access to government, government jobs 
or prospect of government jobs to those who were willing to endorse 
CVE Policing and to facilitate its implementation and enforcement in 
Muslim American communities. Again, in order for CVE policing to 
work to its optimal effect, robust Muslim American support was 
necessary. 
Scores of Muslim American organizations participated, including a 
“Dearborn group led by Lebanese-Americans”310 that changed its name 
from the Lebanese American Heritage Club to Leaders Advancing and 
Helping Communities (“LAHC”), a decision motivated, in large part, to 
access CVE funds from DHS. Led by its Executive Director Wassim 
Mahfouz, the community organization that limited much of its previous 
activity to local political and cultural events, received $500,000 in 2017 
to lay the groundwork for CVE Policing in Dearborn, Michiganhome 
to a concentrated and sizable Muslim American population.311 
Almost overnight, the LAHC converted from local cultural 
organization into a de facto policing outfit, laced with the resources to 
lay the groundwork for CVE Policing in Dearborn area schools, 
community centers, and meeting places. The makeover would create a 
slew of new jobs for their staff, higher salaries, and just as importantly, 
direct reach into Washington, DC. Headquartered in the heart of 
Dearborn, Michigan, LAHC leadership had strong ties with the Shia 
Muslim establishment and leadership in the city, and leveraged this 
appeal to DHS, and furnished CVE with the Shia Muslim partner it 
 
 310. Niraj Warikoo, Dearborn Group Gets $500,000 Grant from DHS to Counter Extremism, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan. 19, 2017, 7:42 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/ocal/ 
michigan/wayne/2017/01/19/lebanese-american-grant-extremism/96789812/.  
 311. Id.  
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coveted, in the most populous Shia Muslim community in the country. 
Furthermore, intensifying sectarian tension in the Mideast and shifting 
relations with Iran (who backed the Lebanese Shia Muslim group 
Hezbollah, which is widely supported by Shia Muslim community in the 
city312) was key in LAHC seeking to be a primary partner of Dearborn’s 
CVE program. 
While Mahfouz stated that “[t]he funding will be specifically used 
to sustain existing programming . . . [including] youth development, 
nurturing parenting, substance abuse prevention,”313 these seemingly 
benign programs were given greater clarity by DHS Secretary, who 
released a statement the week before it was made public that LAHC 
received the funding, clarifying, “In this age of self-radicalization and 
terrorist-inspired acts of violence, domestic-based efforts to counter 
violent extremism have become a homeland security 
imperative. . . . The funding will go for activities that include 
intervention, developing resilience, challenging the narrative, and 
building capacity.”314 And schools, under the Trump Administration, 
would be the terrain where LAHC would have carried out the project of 
identifying and preempting radicalization. 
 However, the funds were awarded after the election of Donald 
Trump, who castigated Islam through rhetoric and policy. Therefore, 
LAHC was expected to carry forward programming in elementary, 
junior and high schools in Dearborn that centered on signaling forms of 
Islamic extremism, reporting suspicious activity of classmates, and 
developing informants and deputizing teachers as watchdogs within 
schools under a candidate that declared, “Islam hates us.”315 
CVE policing in a setting like Dearborn would have capitalized on 
already profuse tensions between Shia and Sunni Muslims to push 
forward CVE strategy. For example, Lebanese or Iraqi Shiites would 
have been sought after as informants against Yemeni or Palestinian 
Sunnis, considering that radicalization is generally understood and 
enforced as a Sunni phenomenon by the state. The LAHC’s identity as a 
largely Lebanese Shiite organization, again, made it an attractive 
partner for CVE policing, and the large sum of money it was set to 
receive would be compensation for stirring sectarian divide to facilitate 
the state’s witch hunt for Muslim radicals among young students. While 
LAHC, like the Muslim Public Affairs Council (“MPAC”) and other 
 
 312. “On the streets of Dearborn, Hezbollah is not seen as a terrorist group but as a heroic 
resistance force.” E.A. Torriero, They’re 100% American, and Pro-Hezbollah, CHI. TRIB. (July 27, 
2006), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-07-27/news/0607270148_1_hezbollah-israeli-terr 
orist-organization.  
 313. Warikoo, supra note 310. 
 314. Warikoo, supra note 310. 
 315. Jose A. DelReal, Trump: ‘I Think Islam Hates Us,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/03/09/trump-i-think-islam-hates-us.  
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groups, garnered ample criticism for carrying forward CVE 
programming under the Obama Administration, doing so under a 
Trump Administration was untenable, opening the floodgates for public 
shaming and outright condemnation. 
News of LAHC receiving the funds instantly spread through the 
metropolitan Detroit community and soon after, the whole country. 
Activists took action, using social media to critique the organization’s 
subcontracted role in pushing CVE Policing, particularly under a Trump 
Administration that openly vilified Muslims, proposed a range of 
damaging policies, and claimed the White House, in large part, was 
under the banner of brazen Islamophobia. 
Abed Ayoub, a Dearborn native and acting Legal Director of the 
American Arab-Discrimination Committee (“ADC”) in Washington, DC, 
critiqued LAHC on Facebook on January 13, 2017: “Lebanese American 
Heritage Club. Will say it publicly. This is beyond disappointing. I’ve 
always respected the organization and the work you do. But this 
requires some explanation,” he wrote, posting a photo of the DHS press 
release naming LAHC as one of the CVE grant recipients, for all to see. 
He later stated, “LAHC’s seat in the heart of Shia Dearborn is a major 
reason why they received the grant. They were going to be used to build 
resilience programs, similar to the one in Montgomery County 
[Maryland], and look to recruit Shia youth and adults to monitor 
Sunnis.”316 
By way of social media shaming, op-eds, and behind-the-scenes 
phone calls, LAHC declined its CVE grant nine days later.317 And in the 
process, it stifled DHS’s attempt to carry forward a sectarian CVE 
program in metropolitan Detroit. It was a major victory against CVE 
policing in Detroit, but a slew of other organizations in “locations across 
the country such as Boston, Minneapolis, Los Angeles,” cities with 
already established hardline CVE Policing programs, and other cities 
tapped for similar programs, accepted the funding.318 Although put to a 
stop, DHS’s efforts to build a formal CVE partnership program within 
the Shia Muslim community signals the will to continue this strategy 
moving forward, and indeed try again. While the patent Islamophobia 
of the Trump Administration was key in undermining DHS efforts with 
the LAHC, future administrations that veer away from explicitly 
Islamophobic rhetoric and policy, like the Obama Administration, will 
 
 316. Interview with Abed Ayoub, Legal Dir., Am. Arab-Discrimination Comm. (Feb. 15, 2017) (on 
file with Author). 
 317. Associated Press, US Nonprofits Reject Funds to Fight Extremism Due to Trump, FOX NEWS 
(Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/02/02/us-nonprofits-reject-funds-to-fight-
extremism-due-to-trump.html.  
 318. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson Announcing First 
Round of DHS’s Countering Violent Extremism Grants (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
news/2017/01/13/statement-secretary-jeh-johnson-announcing-first-round-dhss-countering-violent.  
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likely successfully formalize a CVE partnership in the heart of Shia 
America, Dearborn, and Shia communities beyond it. 
Therefore, enlisting LAHC, a de facto Lebanese Shia Muslim with 
deep reach and resonance with Shia Muslim leadership and the 
community, to carry forward CVE policing in the most concentrated 
Muslim community in the country, would have been successful if not for 
the election of Trump. If they would have received the funds under an 
Obama Administration, or a Clinton Administration had Hillary Clinton 
defeated Trump in the 2016 presidential election, LAHC would of 
undeniably kept the funds, and moved forward with facilitating DHS’s 
sectarian CVE strategy. A possibility that still looms in the metropolitan 
Detroit area, and other areas where Shia Muslims live alongside or 
nearby Sunni Muslim communities. 
In National Security’s Broken Windows, law scholar Amna Akbar 
writes, “[i]n large metropolitan centers, there are certainly physically 
contiguous neighborhoods where Muslims of similar racial or class 
backgrounds reside. In the rest of the country, however, Muslims of 
different classes, races, nationalities, and linguistic and ethnic groups 
are more dispersed.”319 In addition, communities within major 
metropolitan areas are also home to communities that are 
heterogeneous along sectarian lines. Detroit and New York, for 
instance, house several communities where Shia and Sunni Muslim 
populations live within the very same neighborhoods, or adjacent to one 
another. Thus, in addition to examining how class, race and political 
disposition may influence CVE strategy and engagement, sect is also a 
vital area law enforcement that seeks to exploit to further its 
counterterror programs in communities where Shia Muslims live 
alongside, or proximate to, Sunni Muslim communities. 
IV.  BISECTING AMERICAN ISLAM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
A sectarian CVE strategy conflicts with the spirit of the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause. However, the current state of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is very much in flux, with the 
Supreme Court and lower courts divided along lines regarding how to 
interpret the doctrine. Michael McConnell, a leading First Amendment 
scholar, frankly stated that “[i]t is a mess.”320 This mess is one where 
the Supreme Court and lower courts currently apply several tests to 
assess whether a state action infringes on the Establishment Clause, 
most notably, the “Lemon Test,” the “Coercion Test,” and the 
“Endorsement Test,” all of which are closely examined below. 
 
 319. Akbar, supra note 239, at 886.  
 320. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 120 (1992). 
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While the court does not have a firmly established test for 
assessing whether a state or federal policy violates the Establishment 
Clause, this Part analyzes the possible legal constraints of a sectarian 
CVE policing strategy in line with prevailing jurisprudence. In part, it is 
designed to set in motion a broader scholarly discourse and 
investigation of a sectarian CVE policing strategy, particularly as it 
adjusts and develops with coming administrations and, with transitions 
on the Supreme Court, greater uniformity with regard to Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. Subpart A provides a snapshot of prevailing 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, while Subpart B analyzes the 
conflicts CVE Policing has with this doctrine. 
A. PREVAILING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE 
The First Amendment holds that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”321 What qualifies as 
establishment of religion has been interpreted diversely and distinctly, 
particularly by the Supreme Court, which currently applies a range of 
tests to assess whether a state policy or program violates the 
Establishment Clause. While there are a number of applied tests, the 
most common three are the Lemon, Endorsement, and Coercion Tests. 
1.   The Lemon Test 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court established a three-part test to 
assess whether the law or policy at issue violates the Establishment 
Clause.322 The law at issue: (1) must have a primary secular purpose, (2) 
may not have the principal effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, 
and (3) may not foster excessive entanglement with religion.323 If the 
law violates any of these three prongs, the state action will be deemed 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. 
The Lemon Test, ushered in by the Burger Court, has been widely 
criticized by conservative justices since its inception in 1971. Justice 
Scalia, among its most ardent critics, famously analogized the Lemon 
Test to a “ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in 
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,” 
in 1993,324 indicating its declining favor within the Supreme Court. 
Several scholars, most notably Michael McConnell, have also criticized 
the Lemon Test, stating that the test’s ambiguity has led “lower federal 
courts and state courts [to give] the test widely different and seemingly 
contradictory interpretations, and they often ignore it altogether to 
 
 321. U.S. CONST. amend I, art. III.  
 322. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 323. Id. at 612–13. 
 324. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993).  
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avoid undesirable results.”325 Therefore, although Lemon has not been 
expressly overruled by the Supreme Court, the test has fallen out of 
favor among current Supreme Court justices. Still, it remains the 
favored test—or at least a doctrinal starting point among the lower 
courts. 
2.   The Endorsement Test 
Frustration with the Lemon Test opened the door for another 
instrument to assess the meaning of the Establishment Clause. In 1984, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor introduced what came to be known as the 
Endorsement Test.326 The test has been framed as an extension of the 
Lemon Test by some,327 while also treated as an entirely separate and 
standalone metric in other cases. 
Per its name, the Endorsement Test investigates and asks whether 
a specific state action amounts to an endorsement of (or against) a 
particular religion.328 By using the reasonably prudent person (“RPP”) 
inquiry, a standard widely applied in other areas of law, the test 
assesses whether a reasonable observer would view the state action or 
policy as endorsing a specific religion or religious practice. If the answer 
is yes, courts applying the Endorsement Test will find the state action to 
be in violation of the Establishment Clause. Justice O’Connor writes, 
“[endorsement] sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.”329 
In 2004, in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, Justice 
O’Connor identified additional relevant factors including: (1) history 
and ubiquity; (2) absence of worship and prayer; (3) absence of 
reference to a particular religion; and (4) minimal religious content.330 
The Endorsement Test is also declining in support in courts.331 The 
retirement of Justice O’Connor in 2005,332 the original author and chief 
 
 325. Michael W. McConnell, Stuck with a Lemon: A New Test for Establishment Clause Cases 
Would Help Ease Current Confusion, 83 A.B.A. J. 46 (1997).  
 326. See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The Endorsement Test was adopted by a 
majority of Supreme Court in Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).  
 327. See, e.g., Kyle Langvardt, The Lawless Rule of the Norm in the Government Religious 
Speech Cases, 20 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 405, 425 (2014).  
 328. Id. at 419–21. 
 329. Id. at 419 n.6 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 330. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37–43 (2004).  
 331. The test also has detractors within the legal academy. For an analysis of the Endorsement 
Test’s shortcomings, see Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. 
& POL. 499, 510–35 (2002); see also Langvardt, supra note 327, at 436–40 (characterizing 
Endorsement, along with the other predominant Establishment tests, as a thin mask for judicial  
fact-finding when applied to government religious speech).  
 332. Richard W. Stevenson, O’Connor, First Woman Supreme Court Justice, Resigns After  
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proponent of the Endorsement Test, signaled a decline in the test being 
used as the principal tool for testing the bounds of the Establishment 
Clause by the Supreme Court. However, it is regarded by some as the 
“reigning standard by which potential Establishment Clause violations 
are judged.”333 Thus, the Court, depending on its composition, may very 
well examine a sectarian CVE strategy using the Endorsement Test if a 
claim were to reach the Supreme Court. 
3.   The Coercion Test 
A 1992 Supreme Court decision addressing whether public schools 
can sponsor faith group leaders to lead prayer on campus introduced a 
third test used to assess the bounds of the Establishment Clause. In Lee 
v. Weisman, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion that 
included the framing and articulation of the “Coercion Test.”334 Within 
the factual context of the case, Kennedy defined government coercion as 
placement of: 
[S]ubtle and indirect public and peer pressure on attending students 
to stand as a group or maintain respectful silence during the 
invocation and benediction. A reasonable dissenter of high school age 
could believe that standing or remaining silent signified her own 
participation in, or approval of, the group exercise, rather than her 
respect for it. And the State may not place the student dissenter in the 
dilemma of participating or protesting.335 
Beyond the public school context, Justice Kennedy offered a 
broader articulation of coercion, writing “[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a 
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise 
act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith.’”336 
Justice Scalia, among others, critiqued a softer version of the 
Coercion Test,337 by arguing that the established tradition of permitting 
non-sectarian prayer at public schools conflicted with the test and the 
ruling in Weisman. In essence, Justice Scalia was arguing for a harder 
articulation of coercion that made it very difficult to bring 
Establishment Clause claims against a state actor. Justice Scalia’s 
critique, and more conservative conception of coercion, again signaled 
the great division within the Supreme Court with regard to how to 
 
24 Years, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/01/politics/oconnor-first 
-woman-supreme-court-justice-resigns-after-24-years.html.  
 333. Rascoff, supra note 30, at 170.  
 334. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). Kennedy’s variation on the coercion test is 
idiosyncratic; he is the only one who believes that peer pressure can count as coercive. Kennedy 
clarified that the peer-pressure rationale does not extend to adults in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
134 S. Ct. 1811, 1827 (2014), 
 335. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 578.  
 336. Id. at 587.  
 337. Id. at 631–47. 
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interpret the Establishment Clause and which test to apply in claims 
alleging violations, which continues today even after his passing in 
February of 2016.338 
This has created great confusion within the Supreme Court today, 
and a scattered and unpredictable jurisprudential landscape with 
regard to resolving claims involving the Establishment 
Clauseincluding CVE policing. The following section will highlight the 
most compelling Establishment Clause claims against CVE policing 
within the framework of these three tests. Although the future trajectory 
of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is unclear, the analysis 
provides general guidance as to the nature of the claims that may be 
advanced within a Court divided along jurisprudential lines. 
B. CONFLICTS AND CONSTRAINTS 
In Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the 
War on Terrorism, Karen Engle argues that the war on terror is 
enabled by an underlying binary that classified Muslim citizens as 
either “good” and “bad.”339 More specifically, “the good Muslim 
category provides a means . . . to support the United States’ internal as 
well as external attempts to fight the war on terrorism [against bad 
Muslims], thus reinforcing the war’s legitimacy.”340 
After 9/11, citizens performed the role of “good Muslims” by 
denouncing terrorism, supporting the war on terror, and waving the 
American flag.341 However, in the counter-radicalization era, being a 
good Muslim citizen is manifested by endorsement of the CVE Program, 
partnering with DHS as a community stakeholder to carry it forward in 
designated communities, and perhaps most optimally, serving as an 
informant.342 Muslims who support CVE programming, and moreover, 
observe a sect or interpretation of Islam that is believed to be insulated 
from the dangers of radicalization, are presumptively good Muslims. 
Those who do not, and worship a sect that is linked, or within the 
penumbra, of an interpretation or tradition linked to radicalization, are 
conceived of as bad Muslims. 
This good/bad binary, which has driven war on terror policy and 
engagement of Muslim communities following 9/11, has taken on 
greater sectarian implications with the formal institution of CVE 
programming and policing. By pursing and framing radicalization as a 
Sunni phenomenon, the state is tacitly classifying Sunni Islam as the 
 
 338. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES  
(Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.  
 339. See Engle, supra note 293.  
 340. Engle, supra note 293, at 62.  
 341. Engle, supra note 293, at 101.  
 342. See Beydoun, supra note 240. 
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source inspiring homegrown radicals, and thus, the sect responsible for 
mobilizing bad Muslims (with regard to radicalization). 
In Establishing Official Islam?: The Law and Strategy of Counter-
Radicalization, Samuel Rascoff analyzes whether the counterterror 
program meets the constitutional parameters of prevailing First 
Amendment Establishment Clause doctrine.343 His analysis, however, 
does not grapple specifically with endorsement or castigation of specific 
sects, but instead, grapples generally with sweeping and stereotypical 
iterations of Islam adopted by state agencies, and their civic 
organization interlocutors. Though several of these civic organizations, 
such as MPAC and CAIR, are in part motivated by sect, Rascoff does not 
engage with sectarianism and its impact. By providing a general 
analysis of how prevailing CVE policy and policing may infringe on the 
Establishment Clause, this Article extends the analysis and enables 
future examination along lines of sect. 
1.   A Lemon Test Analysis 
Under the Lemon Test, an Establishment Clause challenge against 
CVE under a sectarian theory must prove that it: (1) does not have a 
primary secular purpose, (2) may have the principal effect of inhibiting 
religion; and (3) may foster excessive entanglement with religion.344 
CVE strategy and policing, as it currently stands, has the principal 
objective of countering terrorism, and specifically, preventing 
homegrown radicalization. Although the definition of radicalization, as 
applied and pursued by DHS, aligns with Islam, the fundamental 
purpose of the program is secular in nature. 
Moving on to the second prong, CVE policing strategy does have 
the effect of inhibiting the practice of Islam, and although in its infancy, 
a sectarian CVE policing strategy may inhibit the free exercise of Sunni 
Islamic traditions. “Through its enforcement, CVE marks radicalization 
as an identity crime assigned to Sunni Muslim Americans[,]”345 
therefore, Sunni Muslims may fear outward expression or observation 
of their faith for fear of the prospect of inviting CVE surveillance. 
Furthermore, whether a sectarian CVE policing strategy violates 
the second prong of the Lemon Test hinges on whether inhibiting the 
practice of Sunni Islam is the program’s “principal” effect.346 In the 
program’s current form, courts will likely rule against a challenge 
stating a sectarian theory, largely because of the uncertainty of CVE’s 
future direction under the Trump Administration, and also because a 
sectarian strategy is still in its embryonic stages. However, the more 
 
 343. See Rascoff, supra note 30, at 162–79.  
 344. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).  
 345. Beydoun, supra note 240, at 34.  
 346. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
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DHS seeks to partner up with Shia, Sufi and other minority sects and 
sub-sects against Sunni traditions it profiles as vulnerable to 
radicalization, the riper and resonant an inhibition of religion argument 
becomes. 
The third prong of the Lemon Test, investigating state 
entanglement with a religious institution, sheds more light on a 
sectarian CVE strategy. Entanglement arises when the relationship 
between a state actor and religious institution requires, 
“comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state 
surveillance . . . .”347 Thus, the first order of inquiry is into the character 
of the institution partnering with DHS to carry forward CVE policing, or 
receiving funds from DHS to partake in CVE programming. If the 
organization is a secular civic organization, then the prospect of 
entanglement is minimal. However, if it is a religious organization, such 
as a Shia Muslim mosque or educational center, then the prospect of 
entanglement rises. 
Therefore, instead of partnering with and distributing CVE grants 
to religious organizations, DHS will seek to partner with proxy actors in 
order to circumvent entanglement. This is illustrated by the case study 
cited in Part III, whereby DHS allocated funds to the LAHC, a civic 
organization while outwardly and legally secular in nature, has deep 
and intimate ties with the Shia Muslim religious establishment. By 
partnering with LAHC, instead of religious leadership at the Islamic 
Center of America, for instance, DHS is able to stave off the appearance 
of direct entanglement, and as articulated below, the appearance of 
endorsement. In sum, entanglement raises the greatest concerns for a 
sectarian CVE strategy, thus making the Lemon Testif applied by a 
courtan attractive test for those challenging it. 
2.   Endorsement Test Analysis 
Does a sectarian CVE policing strategy endorse Shia Islam as a 
preferred or “moderate” form Islam while branding Sunni Islam a sect 
that inspires radicalization? This is the fundamental query attached to 
an Endorsement Test analysis of a sectarian CVE policing strategy. 
More specifically, will an RPP finding that CVE, in its current form, 
endorses one sect of Islam over the other?348 
Framing and pursing CVE as a Sunni Muslim phenomenon is 
tantamount to a negative endorsement. Fearing that Sunni Muslims, of 
various traditions, may radicalize, and pursuing subjects that fit within 
this profile, as discussed in Part III, opens the door for collaboration 
with Shia Muslims that if not internally, but publicly, may amount to an 
 
 347. Id. at 619.  
 348. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).  
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endorsement of Shia Islam. Again, since Shia Islam is at odds with 
Sunni Islam, and (extremist) Sunni Islam is the sect adopted by Al 
Qaeda, ISIS and other terror networks that (are purported to) inspire 
radicalization, then collaboration with Shia Muslim institutions and 
individuals may amount to a de facto endorsement of the sect. And, 
particularly as a sectarian CVE strategy mounts and expands, the 
impression held by a reasonable person. 
In essence, the Endorsement Test “looks at violations of the 
Establishment Clause in terms of political equality and the recognition 
of religious pluralism.”349 This mandate of equality and commitment to 
religious pluralism is infringed upon by the idea that a state agency has 
effectively cast one sect, Sunni Islam, as a source of radicalization, while 
another, Shia Islam, an exempt from and opposed to this threat. 
Furthermore, since CVE is a form of “structural Islamophobia,”350 
framing radicalization as a Sunni phenomenon, and Shia Islam as 
exempt from susceptibility to radicalization, are messages filtered to the 
broader polity, which brands the latter with a negative endorsement 
and the former sect with a positive one in regard to domestic 
counterterror policy.351 However, as articulated above, DHS will seek to 
circumvent this appearance by drafting formal CVE memoranda that 
frames radicalization, or the prospect of it, in broad non-sectarian 
terms, and second, avoid working directly with per se religious 
institutions. 
With its emphasis on endorsement, or the appearance of it, over 
material engagement and entanglement with a religious institution, the 
Endorsement Test offers a favorable basis for arguing that a sectarian 
CVE policing strategy violates the Establishment Clause. 
3.   Coercion Test Analysis 
The primary query under the Coercion Test is whether a sectarian 
CVE policing strategy “coerce[s] anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a 
[state] religion or religious faith . . . .’”352 Framed more specifically: 
first, does a sectarian CVE policing strategy compel Muslims support or 
observe Islamic traditions that are not associated with radicalization, 
and second, does it establish a specific sect (of Islam) as the state’s 
preferred tradition? 
 
 349. Rascoff, supra note 30, at 170.  
 350. Beydoun, supra note 25, at 115.  
 351. I call this process “dialectical Islamophobia,” whereby state policy, “shapes, reshapes, and 
confirms popular views or attitudes about Islam and Muslim subjects inside and outside of America’s 
borders.” Beydoun, supra note 25, at 119.  
 352. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).  
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In Establishing Official Islam, Rascoff writes that “the state is 
more likely to underwrite liberal Muslim voices, putting pressure on 
groups and individuals to reconfigure their belief systems to suit the 
temper of the times.”353 “Reconfiguration” may be along broad religious 
lines, for instance, pushing individuals from a position of devoutness to 
that of a secular disposition. Or, internally, from an Islamic sect marked 
as being prone to radicalization to one that is deemed “liberal” or 
“moderate,” such as Sufi or Shia Islam. 
Since the “core intuition behind counter-radicalization is that the 
prevention of future violence requires official involvement in shaping 
the ideational currents that are thought to underpin that violence,”354 
this process of shaping what qualifies as “moderate” Islam and “Islamic 
extremism” has the effect of incentivizing Muslims to practice sects or 
traditions the state has sanctioned as moderate in relation to 
counterterrorism (Sufism, Shia Islam), and pressures against observing 
iterations DHS links to radicalization (Salafi, Wahabbis Sunnism). 
This pressure from the state has the effect of sanctioning  
non-threatening Islamic traditions, while casting those linked to 
radicalization as pariahs. In turn, giving rise to state action that veers in 
the direction of establishing specific forms of Islam as traditions 
preferred by the state, and those branded as pariahs castigated by the 
state. 
Beyond the three most prominent tests, dicta from a notable 
Establishment Clause case in 2005 may provide more guidance for state 
action that exacerbates sectarian tension. In Van Orden v. Perry, a 
Supreme Court case involving a display of the Ten Commandments in 
on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol building in Austin,355 Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence provides persuasive authority against a CVE 
sectarian strategy that not only exploits tensions between Sunni and 
Shia Muslims, but indeed, exacerbates them. Quoting Justices Goldberg 
and Harlan, Breyer writes that, “[G]overnment must ‘neither engage in 
nor compel religious practices,’ that it must ‘effect no favoritism among 
sects . . . .”356 
Within the framework of CVE strategy, which ties radicalization to 
Sunni Islam and, in the interim, viewed Shia Muslims as insulated from 
radicalization, the pursuit of the latter may be tantamount to the 
favoritism Breyer, and the justices he echoes, warned against. Which, 
considering the turbulence marring Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, provides persuasive guidance for a legal critique of a 
sectarian CVE strategy. 
 
 353. Rascoff, supra note 30, at 177.  
 354. Rascoff, supra note 30, at 127.  
 355. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698–705 (2005).  
 356. Id. at 698.  
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C. LOOKING AHEAD 
As illustrated above, there are still many questions to be answered 
with regard to the future of Establishment Clause jurisprudencean 
area of constitutional concern that has been dismembered and divided 
for decades. This lack of clarity also pervades the future of CVE strategy 
and policing. However, President Trump and the Republican Party at 
large have demonstrated a commitment to counter-radicalization,357 
and it is highly likely that a future administration run by a Democrat 
would restore the philosophy and strategy employed by the Obama 
Administration.358 Thus, it is my position that counter-radicalization is 
here to stay, and will form the foundation of DHS’s counterterror 
program for many years to come. 
Furthermore, it is also possible that the Supreme Court, divided 
along lines of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, may favor DHS and 
push it to take risks in regard to carrying forward a sectarian CVE 
strategy. A divided court and an absence of clear and uniform 
Establishment Clause guideposts create less rigidity. Therefore, DHS 
may very well explore partnerships with Shia Muslim elements more 
aggressively amid this constitutional flux, emboldened by ambiguity 
and the ability to make justifications in line with constitutional 
standards that favor them. 
Finally, with sectarian tensions more hostile than ever in the 
Mideast and this culture of Sunni-Shia rivalry festering stateside, this 
rift provides too attractive and potent an opportunity for DHS to 
overlook as an expedient to push CVE forward. While the Trump 
Administration has dealt a blow to the community engagement 
dimension of CVE, given that Muslim American organizations of all 
stripes are resistant to work with a DHS controlled by his 
administration, the counterterror program’s short-term future is largely 
unclear. Ironically, it is likely the case that a sectarian CVE strategy 
would be more robust under a Democratic Administration, like the 
Obama Administration, or under a less reactionary and traditional 
 
 357.  See Julia Edwards Ainsley et al., Exclusive: Trump to Focus Counter-Extremism Program 
Solely on Islam-Sources, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2017, 3:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-usa-trump-extremists-program-exclusiv/exclusive-trump-to-focus-counter-extremism-program-
solely-on-islam-sources-idUSKBN15G5VO?il=0. 
 358. Counter-radicalization policing, the signature national security program implemented by 
the Obama Administration, was strongly supported by Hillary Clinton during her candidacy for the 
presidency in 2016. However, CVE under Obama and, if Clinton were elected, would be built around 
the community partnership model cultivated from 2011–2016, which mandates rhetoric and 
outreach efforts that divide Islam into “moderate” and “radical,” instead of the categorical 
castigation employed by Trump. This philosophy is held by most members of the Democratic Party, 
and in my opinion, would be the counter-radicalization program adopted by (most) Democratic 
Party candidates vying for the presidency in 2020.  
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conservative president. One of which is surely to follow the Trump 
Administration. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. State Department has long employed a sectarian foreign 
policy strategy to advance its interests in the Mideast. Until recently, 
Washington, D.C. stood staunchly with Saudi Arabia, the Sunni Muslim 
superpower in the region, while spurning Iran, the Shia Muslim 
hegemon that emerged in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution. 
The DOS’s sectarian strategy reaped early benefits, in the form of 
exclusive rights over Saudi oil and staving off Soviet influence in the 
Mideast. But the DOS’s unwavering allegiance to Saudi Arabia, today, 
exposes it to foreign attacks and “homegrown radicalization” inspired 
terror networks driven by the extremist Sunni ideology enshrined by its 
longtime Sunni ally. Through an at all costs support of Saudi Arabia, the 
U.S. has abetted the spread of an ideology that spawned Al Qaeda, 
which coordinated the 9/11 terror attacks; and most recently, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syriathe terror network inspiring 
homegrown radicals in the U.S. to commit acts of terror in American 
cities, and abroad. 
A sectarian strategy employed by DHS to advance its counter-
radicalization program was emerging under the Obama Administration. 
In addition to integrating the historic and theological divisions between 
Sunni and Shia Muslims into legal literature, this analyzed how: first, 
increased polarization between Shia and Sunni Muslims facilitates 
DHS’s ability to recruit the former to monitor the latter; and second, 
how a sectarian counter-radicalization strategy makes the State an 
active participant in exacerbating sectarian tension among Muslim 
Americans, which may infringe on the First Amendment Establishment 
Clause. The seeds of this sectarian CVE strategy were planted by the 
Obama Administration, and with sectarian tension increasing in 
Muslim communities abroad and stateside, it will provide a source of 
strategic exploitation for DHS during the protracted war on terror. 
Despite the lack of programmatic and strategic clarity ushered in 
by the Trump Administration, CVE is poised to remain the cornerstone 
of DHS’s domestic counterterror program. While specific 
administrations may tweak the philosophy in line with political view, 
the crux of it, and the theory, seems to be well in place. Therefore, for as 
long as radicalization is exclusively or deeply associated with Islam, and 
sectarian tensions and divides continue to mar Muslims, DHS will 
actively seek to exploit whatever openings, and indeed the most heated 
ones, to develop partnerships, plant informants, and extend policing 
deep in the heart of Muslim communities in the U.S. Indeed, one 
element’s tension and division is another’s opportunity. 
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